Auftragstaktik: The Reasons for German Superiority

The battles of the Gothic Line offensive are, unfortunately, little known in Germany for the simple reason that historians' attention has been drawn to the military events on the eastern and western fronts. However, they constitute, according to Kesselring, a famous chapter in the military history of Germany, a great defensive victory acknowledged by Churchill himself when he spoke of the failure of Alexander's offensive, which had the most serious consequences for the future of Southeastern Europe. In these battles, the tactical genius of Kesselring shone, who, against Hitler's will—who refused to yield an inch of land to the enemy—was able to adopt an elastic defense that, taking advantage of the enemy's mistakes, saved the German army in Italy by halting the advance of the vastly superior Allied forces for six months.

The main phases of Operation Olive (or the Battle of Rimini), the first phase of Alexander's Offensive, can be identified in the first battle of Coriano, when the advance of the British 8th Army was abruptly halted in front of the Coriano ridge between Riccione and Rimini, and in the breakthrough of the Yellow Line (or Rimini Line), when the attackers failed to exploit the success of the breach. The judgment of the German commanders on the Allied conduct of the First Battle of Coriano, writes Montemaggi, is one of astonishment at such tactical behavior. Instead of directing all their armored forces straight at Rimini, Alexander and Leese, the commander of the British 8th Army, had dispersed their forces across the Coriano hills, weakening their attacking strength. It is worth noting that this judgment from the German commanders on the Adriatic contrasts with that of von Senger, then on the Tyrrhenian front, who attributed the failure of the Allied attack not so much to Leese's tactical error but to the fact that the armored forces were no longer up to the changing tactical conditions of the war. A judgment on the effectiveness of tanks in the Battle of Rimini is difficult. The terrain along the coast and further inland was suitable for their use, and we used our few tanks effectively. Our division was less than half-strength, and 5 km from Rimini, on the Montescudo-Rimini road, the route was blocked only by my company and the 4 tanks of Second Lieutenant Hecht. An enemy tank battalion could have easily broken through. We wondered why they didn't do it.

Colonel Horst Pretzell, Chief of Operations of the 10th Army, wrote his observations in the summer of 1945 for the Allied High Command: “To this day, it is not entirely clear, from the German perspective, why the Allies did not immediately exploit the success of the breakthrough of the Gothic Line by aiming directly for Rimini, without worrying about the flanks. At that point, the Germans no longer had reserves capable of offering any real resistance to such an unexpected breakthrough […] During the subsequent course of the battle (the Battle of Coriano, ed.), it might have been more advantageous for the offensive’s striking power if there had been a more concentrated focus of forces on the inner flanks of the attacking Army Corps, and if these forces had been employed in a concentric attack in the coastal sector (the Canadian sector), which was more suitable for tank operations. The stubbornness with which the British 5th Corps was wasted in attacks against the heights of Gemmano and Coriano caused considerable forces to be diverted from the main attack. As a result, the course of the offensive was significantly delayed.” (In the photos, tanks engaged in the Battle of Coriano).

The breakthrough of the Yellow Line at Rimini and the failure of the Allies to exploit the success marked the climax of the Battle of Rimini, in which the 29th Panzergrenadier Division played a key role against the I Canadian Corps, which had become the spearhead of the offensive itself. The Allied attack was preceded by a "monstrous" bombardment, both aerial and naval. The 29th’s war correspondents wrote: “The enemy employed a force of men and equipment previously unknown in the war in Italy. While the bombers attacked the artillery positions, fighter-bombers were permanently in the air, attacking any target, even a single truck and sometimes a single soldier.” I remember those bombings as a nightmare. My company was stationed in a field near the Ausa River under that relentless fire (Trommelfeuer) on the night of the 16th to the 17th. It was three hours of fire that seemed never-ending. With this method, the enemy artillery often blocked our night-time supplies. I also want to point out that the fighter-bombers almost routinely attacked our motorcycle couriers, as if they knew that our entire communications system relied on them. The 29th’s war correspondents continue: “The enemy artillery was far superior to ours. Their ammunition supply was many times greater than ours. Naval artillery also intervened in the ground battles with great success.”

Indeed, the enemy artillery had access to everything they wanted and could do as they pleased. When I was made a prisoner, passing between their batteries, I saw their system. Trucks would arrive at the battery positions, the trucks would pull up alongside each artillery piece, and the shells would pass directly from the vehicle to the gun. From our positions, a furious, devastating defensive fire was launched. Our mortars — which, during the night of September 19 to 20, were resupplied with great difficulty with a supply of 1,000 shells — created such a barrage in front of our positions that the attacking enemy lost both sight and hearing. The mortars, both 80 mm and 120 mm, were our salvation. During the day, our heavy field artillery could not engage in counter-battery fire or barrages for fear of being exposed to the enemy fighter-bombers, always lying in wait from above. The Canadians, our direct adversaries in the Battle of Rimini, claim to have suffered greatly from our artillery fire. I believe they suffered much more from our mortars and infantry artillery. Mortars and infantry artillery had become our artillery, with the motto *Hilf dir selbst, dann hilf Gott* ("Help yourself, and then God will help you"). For this reason, based on my experience, I teach at the Canadian War School that infantry, to defend effectively, needs efficient mortars, infantry guns, and anti-tank weapons of any type. The Italian campaign teaches this.

Using a system developed during World War I, specifically on the Italian front, the British, starting from the night of September 18, illuminated the battlefield with powerful searchlights. The first time, around 10:00 PM, the enemy's searchlights lit up the entire sky, pointing both at the front line and at the clouds, as noted by the 29th’s war correspondents. "These searchlights try to hinder our observation of the enemy, but on the other hand, they are helpful to our drivers in the services, as they can orient themselves more quickly and are no longer hindered by the craters caused by shells. I clearly remember that the illumination posed no obstacle to our observation. On the contrary, it allowed us to see the enemy better, as evidenced by the fact that when the searchlights were operating, the enemy did not attack either us or our nighttime movements."

The presence of fog, however, was truly nightmarish. And here I fully agree with Nardini's words, which, although referring to Cassino, describe the aspect of the Rimini battlefield under the incessant air bombardments and artillery fire from the land and the sea: "Fog in front of the outposts, fog in front of the enemy, fog in front of the hotels, fog for picking up the wounded, fog for bringing ammunition, fog, fog... The day no longer existed; there were only two types of nights: one yellowish, full of clouds, which prevented us from seeing and suffocated us, the other full of flashes, bursts of light, machine gun fire, and terrifying noises." This was the environment of our attack on the Ausa River on September 17, and later the crossing of the Uso River near Santarcangelo. In the second battle of Coriano, where the 29th destroyed 46 enemy tanks, our strongpoints were the houses on which our mobile defense was based. We used the houses or their ruins to defend ourselves for as long as possible: they shielded us from the fire of any weapon.

The Allied mistake of directing the decisive charge of the British 1st Armoured Division against the Coriano ridge instead of the Miramare airport plain near Rimini is also noted by the war correspondents of the 29th Panzergrenadier Division, who wrote that the greatest danger lay along the coast, where the terrain offered the defender few options. The enemy could have massed their tanks and supported their advance with airstrikes and artillery fire from both land and sea. A breakthrough attack would have bypassed the last defensive positions of Coriano and the Covignano hill, allowing the enemy to strike at our defenses from the flank, preventing them from self-destructing with the usual frontal assaults. This comment was evidently inspired by General Polack, who commanded the division from September 1, or by General Herr, who commanded the LXXVI Panzer Corps, but it was also the comment we made on the front line. In fact, the usual frontal attacks, at Cassino and in other areas, allowed us to defend ourselves better and made it much slower for them to advance.

On September 19, the Allied attack, prepared by a terrifying land, air, and naval bombardment, erupted across the entire front, from Rimini to San Marino. The central point of the battle was the scenic Covignano hill, attacked by two Canadian brigades and defended by the two regiments of the 29th, who, in the center of their deployment at San Fortunato, had been forced to place the Turkmen of the 162nd Infantry Division. Terrified by the bombardments, the Turkmen surrendered, allowing the Canadians to break through the last German defense before the Po Valley. On the morning of the 20th, the division still resisted in two strongholds: at Villa Battaglini/Bianchini and at San Lorenzo a Monte. The entire sector around it was open to enemy attack. The division was at the end of its strength — the correspondents write.

And here is the novelty, which, in fact, is not a novelty. The victorious Allies do not exploit their success. For incomprehensible reasons, the enemy halts and does not vigorously seize this opportunity. Perhaps they were impressed by the unexpected and determined resistance of those two small isolated centers. It is thanks to these two groups of fighters that the day did not end in disaster. In the face of a breakthrough attack, launched by the enemy with all his forces, the division would have had nothing left to oppose it. The battle of Covignano, known in the Allied chronicles as the Battle of San Fortunato, is a classic example of the failure to exploit success. As so many times during the Italian campaign, the enemy gave us time to reorganize, occupy new defensive positions, and prepare to withstand a new attack. A German officer, even at the company commander level, knowing that the regiment's task was to reach the Marecchia River, would not have stopped at the isolated resistance of San Lorenzo a Monte, but would have continued toward the river to reach it before the retreating enemy! We withdrew in good order, undisturbed, occupying intermediate defensive positions, bypassing one strongpoint after another, using a method tested during our training, which gave us security and calm, while the enemy remained sufficiently distant behind us. For the division, this pause on September 20 and 21 was an unexpected gift. It gave us the opportunity to organize all the units and reorder them for the upcoming deployment north of the Marecchia.

The Allied generals cited the rain as the reason for not exploiting their success, which indeed caused a significant flood… but a few days later! Their justification is unconvincing — write the correspondents of the 29th. "On the southern bank of the Marecchia, only a few outposts remained. The river, in our sector, with its low banks, its hard gravel bed, and almost no water, certainly did not represent an obstacle (this is also proven by the fact that, due to the riverbed's practicability, the famous Roman bridge of Tiberius was considered naturally unnecessary to destroy and was left intact by the German engineers)." Personally, I don't recall any rain on September 20 and 21. I remember that, while withdrawing toward the Uso River, near San Vito, the countryside was illuminated by the haystacks set on fire by the opposing artillery, something that wouldn't have happened if the haystacks had been wet.

The Battle of Rimini was the largest battle of armaments in Italy. The enemy, vastly superior in all areas, had complete air superiority. They could frequently rotate their troops and attack after just a few days with fresh forces. Much of their success was due to their artillery, which had an enormous number of pieces of all calibers and an enormous supply of ammunition. Often, their artillery destroyed our defensive positions even before the infantry attacks, breaking the morale of our troops... If the enemy, despite this, did not succeed, it was due to the systematic rigidity of their attacks, which sought to avoid any risk, and to the determination of our infantry and their supporting weapons. All the fighting units demonstrated superhuman strength.

This is the story of the Battle of Rimini as seen by the 29th Armored Grenadier Division, which was one of its key participants. As for me, I would like to add three things:

1. The Allies frequently rotated their troops, while we kept the same men on the front lines, which wore us down deeply;
2. Since the beginning of the second battle of Coriano on September 13, we fought continuously, day and night, moving from one emergency and crisis situation to another, with the companies almost always isolated. Our morale suffered greatly, to the point that, in the end, the Feldgendarmerie had to intervene to stop the scattered soldiers;
3. The support for the infantry was provided by the company mortars (80 mm.), the battalion mortars (120 mm.), and the regimental infantry artillery. Our heavy field artillery in my frontline sector was never seen during the day, nor was it heard at night.

But the Gothic Line offensive did not end with the Battle of Rimini and the halt imposed on the Allied troops on September 29 at the Rubicon River. The new commander of the British 8th Army shifted the fighting to the hills south of Cesena, so my regiment was sent to Montecodruzzo and Monteleone to fight against the Mongolian-Nepalese Gurkhas, who were formidable in night combat. We were then transferred south of Bologna to oppose the Americans. Our losses had been heavy. At the Rubicon, my company was reduced to 30 men. In three days, it was brought back to 110 fighters, more than half of whom we lost in the 12 days of fighting against the Gurkhas. By the time we arrived at the new front near Bologna, we were barely fifty.

The 29th Panzergrenadier Division was tasked with positioning itself between the 65th Infantry Division on the right and the 362nd Infantry Division on the left, between the state road 65 Florence-Bologna and the valley of the Zena River. Our 15th Regiment was fighting south of Cesena, while the 71st Regiment was defending the sector south of Zula and Castel di Zena. The II/15 Battalion arrived on October 20 in the Gorgognano sector, and the I/15 Battalion positioned itself the next day in the Casa Casetta sector in the center of the valley. Then, the III/15 Battalion also arrived in the Poggio sector. On the mountains to our left, the reconnaissance unit, Aufklärungs-Abteilung 400, took position. The river was in flood due to continuous rain. The very narrow valley did not allow a battalion to properly deploy, and the dominating positions were in the hands of the Americans of the 34th Infantry Division. In the valley floor, there was only one road, with a few mule tracks and some scattered groups of houses. Occasionally, a rare isolated house could be seen: the gray, muddy land covered a rocky bed, making it impossible to dig any defensive preparations.

The fighting began immediately: the 71st Regiment against the American 91st Infantry Division, and the 15th Regiment against the 34th Infantry Division. The American way of fighting was very different from ours. They gave the impression of still being immature in battle. A bit of rain, a bit of river water above the embankments, and the fighting would be suspended. Lucky them! It seemed like they no longer wanted to fight. They surrendered prisoners very easily. Only this can explain the numerous captures of 100, 80, 70, or 50 prisoners at a time! They would quickly abandon their positions to retreat, while our Oberkommando (High Command) seemed to have no understanding of us. We had to cross the swollen Zena River three or four times if necessary… and we, soaking wet from head to toe, had no chance of drying off quickly. We had to fight in the pouring rain, on slippery ground, in the cold of the night. I believe we survived only because we lit fires in the chimneys of some houses, taking turns warming up, squad by squad, gulping down strong liquor, vodka...

As I mentioned, my Battalion defended the Zena Valley, frequently changing positions and defensive layouts, from three companies in line to three echelons in depth. Between October 20 and 31, the diary of my company describes the sequence of engagements, including the American attack on the 24th that forced us to abandon the Poggio, the withdrawal to the 2nd and 3rd echelons when the III/15 Battalion replaced us on the front line on the 25th, the counterattack by my company and the 9th company of the III Battalion to recapture the Poggio and capture about fifty enemies on the 26th, the positioning of my command at Casa Casetta, and the American attacks on the nights of October 28, 29, and 30, all of which were successfully repelled. The replacements created new problems for me: about thirty seventeen-year-old boys who I had to restrain, and about fifteen former Luftwaffe airmen who had been stationed in Germany for six years and had neither experience nor the desire to fight.

Then, on October 31, I fell ill and was transported to Field Hospital No. 29 in Montagnana. During my absence, the Americans finally took Casa Casetta, but they were pushed back a few days later.

Thus, Clark's push came to a halt at the end of October, 15 km from Bologna.

This information and this text are from Gerhard Muhm.

Bibliography

Documents and Documentary Texts:

• Ktb (Kriegstagebücher) of the 10th Army and the 14th Army, of the 76th Pz. Corps and the 14th Pz. Corps; Zustandsberichte (Mtl) of the 29th Pz. Gren. Div. 1.7.43 – 1.4.45.
• Divisional histories by Heinz Greiner, 362nd Div.; Harry Hoppe, 278th Div.; Joachim Lemelsen, 29th Div.
• Gerhard Muhm, Geschichte der 1. Kp. Pz. Gren. Rgt. 15 (1945-46).

Additional Sources:

• Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Berlin, 1980.
• Gordon A. Craig, Die Preussische-deutsche Armee 1640-1945, Dresden, 1980.
• Müller-Hillebrand, Das Deutsche Heer 1939-1945, Ed. Mittler, 1954.
• G. Battisti, Studio sulla Linea Gotica e sui principi della dottrina difensiva dell’Esercito Tedesco 1944-45.
• Werner Haupt, Kriegsschauplatz Italien 1943-1945, Stuttgart, 1977.
• Albert Kesselring, Soldat bis zum letzten Tag, 1954.
• Amedeo Montemaggi, Offensiva della Linea Gotica, Bologna, 1980.
• Amedeo Montemaggi, Rimini-San Marino ’44, Rimini, 1983.
• Amedeo Montemaggi, Savignano ’44, Rimini, 1985.
• Walter Nardini, Cassino, Bad Nauheim, 1975.
• Mario Puddu, Tra due invasioni. La campagna d’Italia, 1943-45, Roma, 1965.
• A. Segur-Cabanac, Gefechtsbeispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Wien.
• von Senger und Etterlin, Combattere senza paura e senza speranza, Milano, 1968.
• Kurt von Tippelskirch, Geschichte des II Weltkrieges, Bonn, 1951.