The Battle of Monte Altuzzo in the booklet of the 85th Infantry "Custer" Division

The Gothic Line (September,1944)

After the Germans lost Rome they were driven farther and farther north along the entire breadth of Italy. Withdrawing as fast as possible to the next natural barrier, the Arno, they had fought delaying actions in the hills to the south of the river, but their next main line of defense was the Gothic Line, extending roughly from north of Pisa to Rimini. For about a year the Todt Organization had been constructing a line of defenses over the great mountains of the northern Appennines. After the collapse in southern Italy, the construction of these defenses had been greatly speeded up, and they had now become a formidable defense system.

The mountains themselves were difficult obstacles to an attacking force. Rising steeply to a great ridge whose peaks varied from 3,000 to 5,000 feet high, crossed by few roads, these masses offered difficulty even in scaling. Beyond the first ridge, 20 miles farther north rose another high ridge before the descent into the Po Valley began. It was the first ridge, the watershed, that the enemy was defending.

In the first weeks of September, within the framework of Operation “Olive”, the US Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army launched a coordinated attack on this line. The Fifth Army was to attack the western half, and II Corps was making the Army's main effort on the right flank. When the 85th Division joined the attack, it was to make the Corps' main effort on the Corps' own right flank. The Division's first problem was to cross the mountains, breaking through the part of the Gothic Line that defended the Giogo Pass, through which ran the only first-class road in the Division's sector.

As the Division moved up through Florence in the second week of September the mountains facing it appeared a solid wall. After the ascent began the growth thinned out. At the top there was little but great splintered rocky masses and steep cliffs.

Here and there along the lower slopes a cart road wound to a solitary stone farmhouse, beyond these mule and goat trails climbed a short distance into the scrub and vanished, and then there was nothing but ragged rock. The highway, which passed through Il Giogo (Pass), was bordered by stands of pine and hemlock, but most of these before and during the attack were reduced to stumps and torn branches by the terrific concentrations of artillery fire. Lacking roads, mules and men brought up supplies on their backs. Approximately 1,000 mules supported the operations.

The fall rains had begun in the first days of September, but these had let up before the attack. The weather was now often clear and bright, though in the evening and early morning, mist settled in the ravines and draws. The autumn chill had begun, but there was no frost.

At the beginning of the attack the 1st Battalion of the 12th Parachute Regiment of the 4th Parachute Division composed the chief forces opposing the Division. Later, elements of the 3rd Battalion were thrown in when it was evident that a main effort was being made here.

The Mount Altuzzo, immediately to the right of Il Giogo Pass, dominated the road passing over the mountains to Firenzuola, and from his positions on this mountain and on Monticelli, in the 91st Division sector on the left, the enemy denied our forces the use of the road. East of Altuzzo the next mountain, Verruca, was also strongly fortified, and from this the enemy not merely protected the ridge but was also able to fire upon troops attacking Altuzzo.

For anyone approaching Altuzzo from a low ridge, the ground fell steeply to a narrow stream. Beyond its steep banks a gentle slope opened out for a few acres into pastures and cultivated fields. This slope was enclosed on three sides by a fringe of woods and brambles up to the slopes and ravines of the mountain itself. Troops moving from the stream to the fields along the wooded edges were exposed to observation from two and sometimes three of Altuzzo's spurs. The ridge leading to the southern summit of the mountain, Hill 926 of Altuzzo, included three hills: 578, 624 and 782. The Verruca formation was similar, with the advance leading over steep climbs and ravines. The approach used by the forces attacking the summit, Hill 930, followed the ridge that included Hills 591, 732 and 724.

The enemy bunkers were on the forward slopes. Dug 6–9 metres into earth and rock, covered with great piles of huge logs and boulders, with embrasures opening through rocks and felled trees, these bunkers were vulnerable to artillery only if hit directly. The infantry would have to eliminate them one by one. The machine-gun nests and connecting trenches were protected by logs and slabs of rock.

The attack on Monte Altuzzo and Monte Verruca

The Division attacked at 6 a.m. on 13 September, starting with two regiments in line, each with two battalions abreast. On the left the 338th Infantry attacked towards Altuzzo, and on the right the 339th towards Verruca. In the early hours of the morning the Division Artillery and the supporting artillery of II Corps unleashed a tremendous bombardment on the enemy positions. It was not as concentrated in time as the one that had preceded the Minturno offensive, but the total number of rounds fired was even greater. During the attack the powerful 240 mm guns were a particularly important factor in the breakthrough and in the gradual demoralisation of the enemy. The air force also sent aircraft to bomb and strafe roads, supply installations in the rear and positions on the ridges.

The 1st Battalion of the 338th attacked on the left of the regimental sector in a column of companies; the 2nd, on the right, attacked with two companies abreast. All companies came under mortar and small-arms fire, which grew heavier as the day went on. The 1st Battalion moved south of “La Rocca” and – amid this storm of fire – attacked towards Hill 926 of Altuzzo. By nightfall no significant progress had been made, and the 2nd Battalion fared no better.

The 339th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 2nd on the right, advanced towards Verruca, moving on Hill 617 and the Poggio Rotto ridge. Their advance was quickly stopped by heavy artillery concentrations and grazing machine-gun fire, so intense that the troops could not improve the positions they had first taken. Tank destroyers of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion began firing on the three fortified houses on Hill 591 that blocked the way to Verruca, and during the day and night resistance there was gradually reduced. One company of the 2nd Battalion got within 200 metres of the crest of Monte Verruca, but the position was not consolidated.

In short, the first day's attack had made little progress. The difficulties were clear, and no one had expected an easy battle: constant hammering was needed. So while the troops dug in, the artillery kept up intermittent fire all night, and early in the morning unleashed another tremendous bombardment before the infantry returned to the attack.

This time the 1st Battalion of the 338th made somewhat more progress. Company B, leading the attack, reached a point about 80 metres from one of Altuzzo's summits. Company E of the 2nd Battalion tied in with Company B's left flank to keep pace with the advance. But the ground gained was not easy to hold.

B Company, advancing over rocky, exposed slopes, came to a point where it had little cover and where it soon found itself fired upon from three sides by machine guns. Even while it attempted to prepare itself for defense, the enemy began counterattacking, in a repetition of the same long-tried German tactics, and the Germans were repulsed each time. For its action on Altuzzo, B Company received a Presidential {Unit} Citation.

For his courage in the attack on Altuzzo on 14 September, Staff Sergeant George D. Keathley of Company B, 338th Infantry, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. When the leaders of the two forward platoons were wounded, Sergeant Keathley, who led the support platoon, took command of the other two. The enemy was counter-attacking fiercely, and after three such attacks only 20 men remained of the two platoons. Sergeant Keathley reorganised them, placing each man where he could best defend the exposed position on the hill. Ammunition was running out, and while directing the defence he moved among the dead and wounded, collected the ammunition of those who could no longer use it and distributed it to the riflemen still in position.

A fourth enemy counterattack by two companies almost overran the position. The Germans charged, firing machine pistols and throwing hand grenades, and the fight now became a bitter hand-to-hand struggle. One grenade shattered Staff Sergeant Keathley's abdomen, but he fought on, holding his entrails in with his left hand. He continued to direct his men and to fire his rifle effectively for 15 minutes till, with the help of artillery fire, the counterattack was driven off. After the enemy had retreated, Staff Sergeant Keathley was led to a sheltered place where he died. The example he had set, and the skill of his direction, were largely responsible for the repulse of the enemy. {The Keathley Dorm at Texas A & M University is named after S/Sgt George Dennis Keathley, class of 1937. There was also a cruiser and an Army Reserve Center named after Sgt Keathley.}

The attacks on Monte Pratone

The stiff resistance met by the 339th Infantry on 14 September forced the commitment of three battalions, with the 3rd Battalion between the 1st and the 2nd. Company L launched the 3rd Battalion's first attack on Hill 591. The houses on top were taken only after bitter fighting, helped by a tank destroyer and a 57 mm anti-tank gun. By then, however, the regiment's advance was slowed by fire from the right, and to straighten the line the 1st British Division, on the right, launched a strong attack in the early afternoon of the 14th, while the 339th prepared to resume the attack that night.

Two hours before midnight the artillery concentrated its fire on Hill 732 and on the fortified houses forming the enemy's main defences, but the enemy still held. A company of the 3rd Battalion reached the saddle between Hills 732 and 724, but the 2nd Battalion still could make no headway in the gullies leading to Poggio Rotto and Signorini. When the 3rd Battalion attacked Hill 723 again on the morning of 15 September, it was again thrown back.

By now it was clear that two regiments were not sufficient to effect the breakthrough of the enemy defenses in the desired time. The 337th Infantry was brought forward to add weight to the attack, taking positions on the right of the 339th. It was decided, in conjunction with the attacks to be continued on Altuzzo and Verruca, to send forces to the Signorini Mass, east of Verruca, and to Monte Pratone, the next high mountain to the northeast. The plan was for the 339th Infantry to continue the advance in its zone, but K Company would move east to seize Signorini. The 66th Infantry Brigade of the 1st British Division would meanwhile cut northwest into the zone of the 85th Division to seize Pratone. The advance of the 66th Infantry Brigade towards Pratone would be followed by the 337th Infantry, which would continue on from that mountain.

While the 337th moved into its forward assembly areas, the other two regiments continued their attacks and the British moved across the mountains towards Pratone. These attacks too were preceded by artillery fire, but every movement of the attacking troops was again met by heavy mortar, machine-gun and small-arms fire. Although the 1st Battalion of the 339th made slight gains, the 3rd was thrown back in all three separate attempts to take Hill 732.

Three days had passed, and the enemy still held the line and was still able to summon his strength to repel our slightest advances. It was nevertheless apparent from the handful of prisoners we had taken that the enemy was short of supplies and in need of replacements. Other elements of the 12th Parachute Regiment had been brought in to strengthen the defense, but more help than these could give was desperately needed.

On the 16th the fighting on the left continued to be fierce, but it became clearer that each small gain meant a definite deterioration of the enemy's strength. More and more of his positions were knocked out, and he could no longer spread his fire so effectively and widely, nor was he able to counterattack as consistently as at the beginning. Throughout the day our forces advanced slowly until by dark elements of the 338th were within a short distance of the peak of Altuzzo. For the final push the 3rd Battalion now came up to pass through the tired 1st.

Meanwhile the 339th continued its attack on Hill 732 without success. Company K's advance towards Signorini was very slow. During the night two more companies, G and F, were sent onto Hills 887 and 918, also part of the Signorini massif, to speed up the attack in that area.

By late morning the British were still 1,000 yards (about 900 metres) from Pratone, and to carry out the plan it was imperative to take Pratone as soon as possible. To make sure of this, the 3rd Battalion of the 337th was sent forward to pass through the 2nd Royal Scots, with orders to attack Pratone at once.

The leading elements met heavy sniper and mortar fire, and in the afternoon were pinned down by machine-gun fire from above. But by sending a platoon of Company K east of Hill 885, a route for a successful advance was found. Company L followed to exploit it and pushed forward rapidly during the night.

At last the breakthrough seemed imminent. The strength of the Altuzzo defences had greatly diminished, the fortifications on Verruca had largely been reduced, and a way had been found to advance towards Pratone. As the troops closed in for the final assault, the prisoners taken showed more and more signs of fatigue and exhaustion after four days of fighting. Many had been without food or water for more than two days: by constantly harassing their supply lines, our artillery had effectively prevented their support units from supplying them. Among the prisoners, however, were also newly arrived reinforcements from units of the 735th Grenadier Regiment and the 305th Reconnaissance Battalion. But these reinforcements were not enough to prevent the breakthrough, and many had arrived too late. Moreover, the reinforcements coming through Firenzuola had been bombarded by our artillery. This had caused them a large number of casualties and dispersed most of the survivors. Entire units were confused and scattered, and many were captured before they could join their formations.

One of the enemy's last efforts in the 339th's sector was an attempt to retake Hill 591. At that point word was received that the 3rd Battalion, 12th Parachute Regiment, had been relieved by the Lehr Brigade on the night of 16 September. The artillery therefore stepped up its fire on the sector. A pre-dawn attack by the 3rd Battalion was planned to catch the Lehr Brigade as disorganised as possible, and by 8 a.m. on 17 September the 3rd Battalion had taken Hills 724 and 732. Company A helped Company L retake Hill 591. The 1st Battalion took Verruca, and by 5 p.m. the 2nd Battalion had taken Hills 918, 802, 1031 and 1036, and the 3rd Battalion had joined the 1st on Verruca. It was now clear that the 339th had broken through the Gothic Line in its zone.

Meanwhile, on the right, troops of the 337th Infantry had climbed along the ridges towards Pratone and through Rampolli draw. In this sector, the resistance was also weakening, but heavy mortar concentrations were still being laid down in the path of the advance and a few bunkers were still being manned. But before midnight, the entire 3rd Battalion had occupied Pratone and was organizing the mountain for defense.

The final attack on Altuzzo

The final attack on Altuzzo had been briefly delayed to allow elements of the 91st Division on the left to take Monticelli. In the early hours of 17 September the positions on the Altuzzo ridge were consolidated. Fontefredda, a height across the road north-west of Altuzzo, still held out, and fire from there harassed our troops, but during the night the remaining heights were taken. The Gothic Line had now been broken along the Division's entire front.

Towards the end, more and more of the enemy gave themselves up—some because they knew they were surrounded and cut off from help; some because they had run out of ammunition and food. By noon of the 18th, 231 prisoners had been taken, and in the next two days as many more were captured. The number of casualties was even greater. The enemy dead were scattered over the mountains.

After fighting five days against a wall of defenses, it was with a solid sense of accomplishment that the troops prepared to continue the attack. For weeks they had heard about the Gothic Line, and their thoughts and feelings had been intent on breaching it. They now had satisfaction in the knowledge that they had taken part in the conquest of another of the enemy's most carefully planned defensive systems.