The historical period of the Resistance movement spanned from the Armistice of September 8, 1943—the CLN (National Liberation Committee) was founded in Rome on September 9—to the early days of May 1945. During these twenty months, an alliance was formed between partisan groups of various backgrounds and civilians against the Fascist regime and the Nazi occupation. Composed of individuals with different ideologies, the military contribution of the partisans intensified in 1944 with the expansion of armed organizations and strategic support from the Allies. Partisan actions contributed significantly to the liberation of territories and the unconditional surrender of German troops on May 3, 1945.
The Resistance in occupied Italy
In addition to its political significance for the future of Italy, the armed Resistance had a decisive military impact. Resistance operations forced approximately 300,000 German soldiers and units of the Italian Social Republic (RSI) to constantly commit themselves to containing partisan activities. During the crucial phase of autumn 1944, as the Allies attempted to break through the Gothic Line, the partisans inflicted considerable losses on German forces, estimated at around 400 men per month. Furthermore, sabotage actions significantly slowed down the fortification work on the German defensive lines in the Apennines. German reports acknowledged that partisan activities represented a serious threat to frontline troops, supplies, and the operation of Italian war industries, which contributed 12% to the German war effort.
The presence of the partisans restricted the control of the RSI to the urban and lowland areas of Northern Italy, reinforcing hostility toward both the Germans and the Fascists. This situation led to the failure of the RSI’s military conscription and prevented the Germans from deporting approximately three million Italian workers to Germany. Furthermore, partisan actions helped save a portion of the northern industrial infrastructure from destruction during the Wehrmacht's retreat, facilitating the post-war economic recovery.
From a strictly military perspective, the armed resistance against Fascists and Germans began immediately following the Armistice of September 8, 1943, and concluded with the liberation of Northern Italy in April 1945. The first groups of fighters organized spontaneously, but over the following months, the movement became structured under the direction of the anti-fascist parties, united within the National Liberation Committee (CLN). This body coordinated the resistance through its regional branches and partisan formations in German-occupied territories, although local units often operated with a degree of autonomy.
Starting from the winter of 1943 the first "bands" of rebels (as they often liked to call themselves) consolidated into better organized formations, mainly "Garibaldi" (socialists and communists) and "Giustizia e Libertà ¦quot; (progressive lay people), alongside some Catholic and, especially in Piedmont, "autonomous" monarchist-oriented formations. At the moment of maximum expansion in the spring of 1945 the partisan formations included approximately 120,000 members. In the twenty months of German occupation, there were a total of around 200,000 fighters in the mountains, and another 100,000 active in the cities.
Bibliografia di riferimento
- F.W.D. DEAKIN, The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall of Italian Fascism, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962.
- G. BOCCA, Storia dell’Italia partigiana, Laterza, 1966.
- S. PELI, La Resistenza in Italia. Storia e critica, Einaudi, 2004.
- A. BRAVO, Resistenza e storiografia: Temi, interpretazioni, revisioni, Franco Angeli, 2005.
- M. BATTINI, La guerra civile italiana (1943-1945), Einaudi, 2011.
- P. COOKE, The Italian Resistance: An Anthology, Manchester University Press, 2013.
The Resistance in Tuscany
The Tuscan rebels, although shorter in duration compared to that of Northern Italy, had a significant military and political impact, primarily due to the region's liberation by the end of 1944. In total, it is estimated that nearly 30,000 Tuscans participated in the resistance as combatants and patriots. A distinctive feature of the Tuscan resistance was the strong coordination between partisan forces and the Tuscan National Liberation Committee (CTLN), which provided not only political direction but also organized military and administrative operations.
In June 1944, the CTLN proclaimed itself the legitimate governing body of the region, planning a series of operations to take control of liberated cities before the arrival of the Allies. This goal was successfully achieved in various contexts, such as in Florence, which came under partisan control on August 11, 1944, despite the Allies' attempt to disarm the partisans. The determination of the latter led to the withdrawal of the order, highlighting their crucial role in the liberation of the city.
The social fabric of Tuscany, which was deeply tied to agriculture, profoundly influenced the local resistance. The support provided by farmers to the partisans proved to be vital, both for survival and for guerrilla activities. Partisan bands, largely composed of young Tuscans, carried out acts of sabotage and seized agricultural goods intended for the Fascist stockpile, returning a portion of the resources to the farmers, with whom they shared a common hope for social redemption in the post-war period.
One of the most active areas during the final phase of the resistance was the Apennine zone between Firenzuola and Imola, as well as the Apuan Alps and Garfagnana, where the resistance reached a level of organization and intensity comparable to that of the Cuneo area.
A controversial case of collaboration between the Allies and the Partisans.
Among the most significant formations was the 36th Garibaldi Brigade "Bianconcini," which operated primarily in the Imola area. After breaking through the Gothic Line at the Giogo Pass and subsequently at the Futa Pass in the second half of September 1944, the U.S. Fifth Army advanced toward Firenzuola, heading in the direction of Castel del Rio and Imola. However, there was a natural obstacle to overcome: Monte Battaglia, located between Casola Valsenio and Castel del Rio, which was held by German formations—specifically the 305th Infantry Division and the 362nd Infantry Division.
The partisans of the 3rd Battalion of the 36th Garibaldi Brigade "Bianconcini," led by Carlo Nicoli, managed to capture the mountain and the surrounding heights of Monte Carnevale and Monte Cappello. On September 27, infantrymen from the U.S. 88th Infantry Division "Blue Devils" reached Monte Battaglia. The report from the commander of the American 350th Regiment states: "The 2nd Battalion seized Monte Battaglia without opposition at about 14:00, finding the mountain already held by a battalion of Italian patriots." However, that same afternoon, German troops launched a fierce counterattack. Driven back the first time, they struck again unsuccessfully the following day, as well as on September 29 and 30. For four days, partisans and Americans fought side-by-side against repeated German assaults.
Later, the Allies replaced the American soldiers with a British unit, whose officer noted in his report: “The castle, now in ruins, is under constant bombardment. The bodies of American soldiers are scattered everywhere...” The battle cost the Allies approximately 2,000 casualties. Despite their contribution, the partisans of the 36th Garibaldi Brigade were subsequently disarmed and sent to the rear. Their participation at Monte Battaglia was not mentioned in the Allied war bulletins. As one American historian observed: “The truth, which the censors forbade from being disseminated at the time, is that it was the Italian partisan troops operating in this sector who were the first to occupy Monte Battaglia, holding it until the arrival of the American forces.” This was certainly due to political and military expediency, censorship, and propaganda, as the “Bianconcini” was communist-oriented; it was also due to operational priorities, reliability, and national prestige. In any case, Monte Battaglia represented a significant collaboration between Italian partisan forces and Allied troops, which, in the context of the Italian campaign, remains an extraordinary case rather than the norm.
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Bibliografia di riferimento
- M. PORZIO, La Resistenza armata: Battaglie partigiane nell’Italia occupata, Laterza, 2006.
- A. D’ANGELO, La 36ª Brigata Garibaldi “Bianconcini” e le battaglie sull’Appennino tosco-emiliano, Edizioni Libreria Universitaria, 2008.
- G. GAGLIANI, Le battaglie della Linea Gotica, Editoriale Lupo, 2009.
- G. OLIVA, La guerra partigiana in Italia: storia della Resistenza, Mondadori, 2011.
- P. LIVI, Resistenza e guerra partigiana in Toscana, Edizioni Medicea, 2013.
The Resistance in Mugello: a special case.
from Ferdinando GATTINI, Giorni da Lupo. Fascismo e resistenza a Vicchio di Mugello tra l’estate ’43 e l’estate ’44, Comune di Vicchio, 1995.
At that time, the Mugello area was characterized by a tendency toward poverty. Since ancient times, the Mugello has always been a transit land toward Romagna, via the Faentina road (of Etruscan origin), and toward the northern peoples of the Po Valley through the Apennine passes. However, despite being crossed by important communication routes, its economic and social relations were almost exclusively tied to Florence, with scarce contact with other regions. Its economic structure was based on a poorly developed industrial sector (consisting of small industries mostly concentrated in the municipalities of Barberino and Borgo San Lorenzo) and an agriculture hampered by the local terrain. Agriculture was the most important resource and was organized according to traditional sharecropping systems, with large farms divided into plots where entire peasant families lived and worked. Given this situation, thinking that the Mugello population's participation in the Resistance was marginal would be a mistake. On the contrary, what happened in this land took on great strategic importance for the subsequent development of the liberation struggle throughout the region. Key factors were the configuration of its territory and its proximity to Florence.
The Tuscan Resistance was short-lived compared to that of other regions in Northern Italy, but it was a vast and well-organized movement aimed at winning the consensus of the population in order to present itself as a self-governing force for the areas liberated by the Allies. In the Mugello, the most important formations were the 2nd Carlo Rosselli Brigade of Justice and Liberty, established in Ronta in October 1943, and the 36th A. Bianconcini Garibaldi Brigade, which was active from January 1944 and grew to include more than 1,250 partisans engaged in major actions such as the occupation of Palazzuolo and Firenzuola. These were supported by various smaller bands. With the stabilization of the front along the Gothic Line, the Apennine passes became vital for both the Germans and the Allies. For this reason, the area was heavily affected by the passage of the war, and the local populations did not respond passively to the needs of the liberation struggle. The relationship with Florence is instead a constant presence in the history of the Mugello, which has lived, developed, and built an identity through its relationship with and the resources it provided to the evolution of Florentine history. During the Resistance, this relationship experienced a period of great intensity, not only due to the contribution of young people from the Mugello who, alongside Potente, contributed to the liberation of the city, but also because Florentine partisans found refuge, opportunities to organize, and a base for recruitment here. It is within this framework that the origins of the partisan movement were generated.
The birth and growth of the partisan movement in the Province of Florence was centered in the Mugello and primarily on Monte Giovi. The movement in Tuscany emerged and developed differently from how it did in the north. In the north, entire groups of the regular army took to the mountains and assumed, from the very beginning, the characteristics of true military formations. This was particularly true in Piedmont, although these were later integrated by civilians who voluntarily chose the mountain path. There is, therefore, a substantial difference between the partisan formations of Tuscany and those of the north, in terms of both political and military character, which also matured during the period in which they operated. In the north, at least in part of the movement, there is a clear form of military organization, especially in the way of fighting. There are also differences in the political orientations to which the various formations adhered, mainly in the north, ranging from the Garibaldini to Giustizia e Libertà, along with many autonomous groups associated with the Catholic movement, as well as entire groupings that were clearly monarchist. These latter movements were almost or entirely absent in Tuscany. While the north had a paramilitary or military organization, in Tuscany it was spontaneous and popular, with few military elements in its ranks, and certainly not decisive ones, involving only a few officers and the total absence of the middle class, including intellectuals.
The Tuscan partisans resembled the men of Pancho Villa more than an army; one only has to look at the photographs of the time. In the north, particularly in Piedmont, there were officers of every rank from the regular army who defined the military structure of those formations. Furthermore, we must not forget that the difference between the partisan movement in Tuscany and that of the north was marked by the distinct socio-economic conditions of the two areas, not just by different geographical conditions. Consider the Tuscan countryside, entirely populated by sharecroppers whose relationship with the landowner was one of subjection and total exploitation. For the peasant, the partisan struggle and opposition to Fascism meant the redemption of their condition—liberation from the constant blackmail of the owner who could take away their land at any moment. The propaganda of the leftist parties had clearly highlighted this serious issue. This is also why Tuscan peasants were the first to help the partisans and became an integral part of the formations themselves. These considerations are useful for understanding the conditions in which the partisans operated in this reality, who, in the month of May, found themselves managing a situation of relative calm. No significant clashes occurred because the partisan patrols sought to avoid them. First and foremost, there was a need to grow stronger and prepare for a new commitment. They wanted to avoid potential reprisals against the civilian populations who had already suffered so much in previous months, and also because major military events were maturing.
The Allied armies were approaching Rome. Shortly thereafter, the partisan forces in Tuscany would face new challenges as they were forced to operate behind enemy lines, making clashes unavoidable. The Germans roamed the valley, and as the front drew nearer, they began their roundups, looting everything they needed. No longer receiving food supplies, they sourced them from the countryside. Peasants tried to save what they could by hiding their livestock everywhere. Even the men were not safe. Young men and those of military age were captured to be sent to Germany, and those who resisted risked being killed. In fact, the Mugello represents one of the cases where the collaboration between peasants and partisans was most productive. This was even more remarkable in an area that was still firmly "white" and Catholic, with a traditional sharecropping foundation, yet where the Communists undoubtedly emerged as the largely dominant force during the partisan struggle.
From the initial actions marked by spontaneity and individual courage, to the first gatherings in Gattaia, Villore, and Monte Giovi, through the discussions to find organizational forms suited to the need for coordination with partisans coming from Florence, and finally to the subsequent necessity of political leadership. One also understands a point of great importance that still requires study: the capacity of the local partisan movement to adapt to the various phases of the struggle, which involved not only military requirements but also organizational and political ones. Witness the transition from a spontaneous struggle by small groups to the need for coordination, the acquisition of an authoritative political and organizational structure, and finally to a fighting force with precise objectives and the goal of governing. All of this presupposes the acquisition of a specific awareness, capable of transforming the aspiration for freedom and the rage against oppressors into something more lasting and purposeful.
This data demands a twofold reflection: both political and historiographical. Regarding the first, it is necessary to note that, in the relationship between peasants and partisans, the latter had the intuition and foresight to take on the specific needs of the peasantry. The defense of the land, the protection of livestock, and the defense of the harvest against landowners were slogans widely shared by both groups, because their living conditions and related problems were also shared. This explains why such a deep bond existed—one that, in other contexts, the Nazi-Fascists tried to break through massacres and slaughters (the Padulivo massacre, the Campo di Marte massacre, the destruction of Vicchio). The second reflection introduces an element of great historical significance: in the post-war period, the Mugello appeared as a markedly leftist area with a strong Communist presence. This situation was not so characterized before the war. An approach to understanding this must start from further back, when, between the end of the century and the first decades of the 1900s, the Mugello was still considered a land with archaic, semi-feudal structural characteristics, featuring a strong Church presence (even from an economic perspective), a powerful aristocracy, and rigid sharecropping as the backbone of the economy. With the birth of the socialist movement, social relations did not change much. It was the Great War that created the divide between one mentality and another. Catholic hegemony was transformed; "white" unions and organizations were born, no longer controllable by the landowners, and with the rise of Fascism, a conflict with the Catholic movement also emerged.
