The Battle of Monte Altuzzo in the booklet of the 85th Infantry "Custer" Division

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While the 363rd Infantry was attacking to the west on the Monticelli ridge, the 338th Infantry Regiment was assaulting Monte Altuzzo, which, with its 926 meters of elevation, defended the eastern side of the Giogo Pass.

The text we are presenting is actually quite brief. It can be found here in its original form, where the various phases of the attack are better articulated by giving titles to different sections of the text. For a detailed understanding of the individual phases of the attack on Altuzzo, it is advisable to refer to another text we provide in a separate article, which is taken from the book. C. BROWN, MACDONALD, S.T. MATHEWS (edited by), Three BattlesArnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1952. Vai all’approfondimento.

The assault on Monte Altuzzo in the booklet of the 85th Infantry Division Minturno to the Appennines1

The Gothic Line (September,1944)

After the Germans lost Rome they were driven farther and farther north along the entire breadth of Italy. Withdrawing as fast as possible to the next natural barrier, the Arno, they had fought delaying actions in the hills to the south of the river, but their next main line of defense was the Gothic Line, extending roughly from north of Pisa to Rimini. For about a year the Todt Organization had been constructing a line of defenses over the great mountains of the northern Appennines. After the collapse in southern Italy, the construction of these defenses had been greatly speeded up, and they had now become a formidable defense system.

The mountains themselves were difficult obstacles to an attacking force. Rising steeply to a great ridge whose peaks varied from 3,000 to 5,000 feet high, crossed by few roads, these masses offered difficulty even in scaling. Beyond the first ridge, 20 miles farther north rose another high ridge before the descent into the Po Valley began. It was the first ridge, the watershed, that the enemy was defending.

In the first weeks of September, the within the framework of Operation “Olive” the American Fifth and British Eighth Armies in the first weeks of September launched a coordinated attack against this line. Fifth Army was to attack the western half, and II Corps was making the main effort of Army on the right flank. The 85th Division, when it joined in the attack, was to make the main effort for Corps on the Corps' right flank. The problem that faced the Division initially was to cross the mountains, breaking through that part of the Gothic Line defending Il Giogo Pass through which wound the single first-class road to the north in the Division sector.

As the Division moved up through Florence in the second week of September the mountains facing it appeared a solid wall. After the ascent began the growth thinned out. At the top there was little but great splintered rocky masses and steep cliffs.

Here and there along the lower slopes a cart road wound to a solitary stone farmhouse, beyond these mule and goat trails climbed a short distance into the scrub and vanished, and then there was nothing but ragged rock. The highway, which passed through Il Giogo (Pass), was bordered by stands of pine and hemlock, but most of these before and during the attack were reduced to stumps and torn branches by the terrific concentrations of artillery fire. Lacking roads, mules and men brought up supplies on their backs. Approximately 1,000 mules supported the operations.

The fall rains had begun in the first days of September, but these had let up before the attack. The weather was now often clear and bright, though in the evening and early morning, mist settled in the ravines and draws. The autumn chill had begun, but there was no frost.

At the beginning of the attack the 1st Battalion of the 12th Parachute Regiment of the 4th Parachute Division composed the chief forces opposing the Division. Later, elements of the 3rd Battalion were thrown in when it was evident that a main effort was being made here.

The Mount Altuzzo, immediately to the right of Il Giogo Pass, dominated the road passing over the mountains to Firenzuola, and from his positions on this mountain and on Monticelli, in the 91st Division sector on the left, the enemy denied our forces the use of the road. East of Altuzzo the next mountain, Verruca, was also strongly fortified, and from this the enemy not merely protected the ridge but was also able to fire upon troops attacking Altuzzo.

Approaching Altuzzo from a low ridge, the ground sloped steeply to a narrow stream. Beyond its steep banks a gradual slope fanned out for a few acres in pastureland and cultivated fields. This slope was enclosed on three sides by a fringe of woods and brambles until the slopes and ravines of the mountain itself were reached. Troops moving up from the stream into the fields along the bordering woods were exposed to view from two and sometimes three sides of the arms of Altuzzo. The ridge leading to the southern crest of the mountain, Hill 926, included three hills 578, 624 and 782. The formation of Verruca was similar, the advance leading up steep ascents and ravines. The approach followed by the forces attacking the summit, Hill 930, led along the ridge including Hills 591, 732, and 724.

The enemy bunkers were on the forward slopes. Dug 20 to 30 feet into the ground and rock, covered with great piles of enormous logs and boulders, with the fire slits opening through rocks of fallen trees, these bunkers were vulnerable to artillery only if hit directly. The infantry would be obliged to clear them individually. Machine gun nests and connecting trenches were protected by logs and slabs of rock.

The attack on Monte Altuzzo and Monte Verruca

The Division attacked at 6 o'clock on the morning of September 13th. To begin with, two regiments were on the line, each with two battalions abreast. On the left, the 338th Infantry attacked towards Altuzzo, and the 339th, on the right, towards Verruca. During the early hours of the morning a tremendous artillery barrage had been laid upon the enemy positions by the Division Artillery and the supporting II Corps artillery units. The barrage was not concentrated in such a short period of time as that preceding the Minturno push, but the total number of rounds fired was even greater. The great 240s, now and during the entire attack, were an especially important factor in the smashing and gradual demoralization of the enemy. The air force also sent over planes to bomb and strafe the roads and the supply installations in the rear as well as the emplacements on the crests.

The 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry attacked on the left of the regimental sector in a column of companies. The 2nd, on the right, attacked with two companies abreast. All were immediately met by intense mortar barrages and small arms fire that increased in intensity as the day wore on. The 1st Battalion moved from south of La Rocca and in the midst of this storm of fire attacked towards Hill 926. By dark, however, it had made little substantial progress. The 2nd Battalion met no better fortune.

The 339th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 2nd on the right, advanced towards Verruca, moving up Hill 617 and the Poggio Rotto Ridge. Their advance was quickly blocked by severe artillery concentrations and grazing machine gun fire. This was so intense that the troops had no opportunity to improve the positions they had won initially. Tank destroyers of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion began firing on the three fortified houses on Hill 591 that blocked the way to Verruca, and during the day and night the resistance here was gradually beaten down. One company of the 2nd Battalion succeeded in coming within 150 yards of the Verruca crest, but as yet no permanent progress was assured.

The first day's attack, in short, had made little headway. Though the difficulties of the attack were becoming clearer, there had been no expectation that this would be an easy battle. What was called for was a constant hammering. Accordingly, while the troops dug in, the artillery kept up intermittent fire throughout the night, and in the early morning let go with another tremendous barrage before the infantry jumped off again.

This time the 1st Battalion of the 338th made somewhat better progress. Company B, spearheading the attack, reached a point within 75 yards of one of the crests of Altuzzo. Company E of the 2nd Battalion tied in with the left of B Company to keep abreast of the advance. But the gains they made were not to be easily held.

B Company, advancing over rocky, exposed slopes, came to a point where it had little cover and where it soon found itself fired upon from three sides by machine guns. Even while it attempted to prepare itself for defense, the enemy began counterattacking, in a repetition of the same long-tried German tactics, and the Germans were repulsed each time. For its action on Altuzzo, B Company received a Presidential {Unit} Citation.

For conspicuous gallantry in the attack on Altuzzo on September 14th, Staff Sergeant George D. Keathley, B Company, 338th Infantry, was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. When the leaders of the two forward platoons were wounded, Staff Sergeant Keathley, platoon guide of the supporting platoon, took over the command of the other two platoons. The enemy was counterattacking fiercely, and after three of these attacks only 20 men remained from the two platoons. Staff Sergeant Keathley reorganized these, placing each man in a position where he could best defend the badly exposed position on the hill. Ammunition was running low, and Staff Sergeant Keathley, while directing the defense, passed among the killed and wounded, collecting ammunition from men who could no longer use it, and distributing it to the remaining defenders.

A fourth enemy counterattack by two companies almost overran the position. The Germans charged, firing machine pistols and throwing hand grenades, and the fight now became a bitter hand-to-hand struggle. One grenade shattered Staff Sergeant Keathley's abdomen, but he fought on, holding his entrails in with his left hand. He continued to direct his men and to fire his rifle effectively for 15 minutes till, with the help of artillery fire, the counterattack was driven off. After the enemy had retreated, Staff Sergeant Keathley was led to a sheltered place where he died. The example he had set, and the skill of his direction, were largely responsible for the repulse of the enemy. {The Keathley Dorm at Texas A & M University is named after S/Sgt George Dennis Keathley, class of 1937. There was also a cruiser and an Army Reserve Center named after Sgt Keathley.}

The attacks on Monte Pratone

Heavy resistance met the 339th Infantry on September 14th. Three battalions were now committed, the 3rd having come in between the 1st and 2nd. Company L made the initial attack of the 3rd Battalion on Hill 591. The houses at the top were captured only after hard fighting. A tank destroyer and a 57mm anti-tank gun aided the attack. But at this time the advance of the regiment was being retarded by fire coming from the right rear, and in order to even the lines the 1st British Division, on the right, made a strong attack in the early afternoon of the 14th, and the 339th prepared to resume its attack that night. 1st British Division, on the right, launched a strong attack in the early afternoon of the 14th, while the 339th prepared to resume the attack that night.

Two hours before midnight the artillery concentrated fire on Hill 732 and the fortified houses that composed the chief enemy fortifications, but the enemy still held on. One company of the 3rd Battalion succeeded in reaching the saddle between Hill 732 and 724, but the 2nd Battalion could still make no headway in the draws leading on to Poggio Rotto and Signorini. When the 3rd Battalion, on the morning of the 15th, again attacked towards Hill 723, they were again repulsed.

By now it was clear that two regiments were not sufficient to effect the breakthrough of the enemy defenses in the desired time. The 337th Infantry was brought forward to add weight to the attack, taking positions on the right of the 339th. It was decided, in conjunction with the attacks to be continued on Altuzzo and Verruca, to send forces to the Signorini Mass, east of Verruca, and to Monte Pratone, the next high mountain to the northeast. The plan was for the 339th Infantry to continue the advance in its zone, but K Company would move east to seize Signorini. The 66th Infantry Brigade of the 1st British Division would meanwhile cut northwest into the zone of the 85th Division to seize Pratone. The advance of the 66th Infantry Brigade towards Pratone would be followed by the 337th Infantry, which would continue on from that mountain.

While the 337th Infantry was moving to forward assembly areas the other two regiments continued their attacks and the British moved over the mountains towards Pratone. These attacks were again preceded by artillery barrages, but again each move by the attacking troops brought down heavy mortar, machine gun and small arms fire. Though the 1st Battalion of the 339th made some slight advances, the 3rd was repulsed each time in the three separate attempts it made to capture Hill 732.

Three days had passed, and the enemy still held the line and was still able to summon his strength to repel our slightest advances. It was nevertheless apparent from the handful of prisoners we had taken that the enemy was short of supplies and in need of replacements. Other elements of the 12th Parachute Regiment had been brought in to strengthen the defense, but more help than these could give was desperately needed.

On the 16th the fighting on the left continued to be fierce, but it became clearer that each small gain meant a definite deterioration of the enemy's strength. More and more of his positions were knocked out, and he could no longer spread his fire so effectively and widely, nor was he able to counterattack as consistently as at the beginning. Throughout the day our forces advanced slowly until by dark elements of the 338th were within a short distance of the peak of Altuzzo. For the final push the 3rd Battalion now came up to pass through the tired 1st.

Meanwhile, the 339th was continuing its attack on Hill 732 without success. K Company's advance towards Signorini was very slow, and during the night two additional companies, G and F, were sent to Hills 887 and 918, also part of the Signorini Mass, to accelerate the attack in that area.

By mid-morning the British were still 1,000 yards short of Pratone, and to accomplish the plan now in effect it was imperative that Pratone be seized as quickly as possible. To assure this, the 3rd Battalion of the 337th was sent ahead to pass through the 2nd Royal Scots, with orders to attack towards Pratone immediately.

Advance elements met heavy sniper and mortar fire, and in mid-afternoon were held down by heavy machine gun fire from high ground to their right. But in sending a platoon of K Company to the east of Hill 885 the route for a successful advance was discovered. Company L followed to exploit the advance, and continued to push ahead rapidly during the night.

Finally, the breakthrough appeared imminent. The strength of the Altuzzo defenses was greatly diminished, the fortifications on Verruca had been largely reduced, and the way had been found to push on to Pratone. As the troops closed in for the kill, the prisoners they took showed more and more the strain and exhaustion of the four days' fighting. Many of them had been without food or water for more than two days. As a result of our steady harassing of their supply lines, our artillery effectively prevented their service units from supplying them. Among the prisoners, however, were newly arrived reinforcements from units of the 735th Grenadier Regiment and the 305th Reconnaissance Battalion. But there had not been enough of these to prevent the breakthrough, and many had come too late. Moreover, reinforcements coming down through Firenzuola had been shelled by our artillery. This had caused them a great number of casualties, and scattered most of the rest. Whole units were confused and lost, and many were taken prisoner before they could join their organizations. through Firenzuola had been bombarded by our artillery. This had caused them a large number of casualties and dispersed most of the survivors. Entire units were confused and scattered, and many were captured before they could join their formations.

One of the last efforts of the enemy in the 339th sector was the recapture of Hill 591. Information was at this time received of the relief of the 3rd Battalion, 12 Parachute Regiment by the Lehr Brigade the night of September 16th. Accordingly, the artillery increased its shelling of the sector. A pre-dawn attack by the 3rd Battalion was planned to catch the Lehr Brigade in as disorganized a state as possible, and by 8 o'clock the morning of the 17th, the 3rd Battalion had seized Hills 724 and 732. Company A helped Company L retake Hill 591. The 1st Battalion seized Verruca, and by 5 o'clock in the afternoon the 2nd Battalion had seized Hills 918, 802, 1,031, and 1,036, and the 3rd Battalion had joined the 1st on Verruca. It was now apparent that the 339th had breached the Gothic Line in its zone.

Meanwhile, on the right, troops of the 337th Infantry had climbed along the ridges towards Pratone and through Rampolli draw. In this sector, the resistance was also weakening, but heavy mortar concentrations were still being laid down in the path of the advance and a few bunkers were still being manned. But before midnight, the entire 3rd Battalion had occupied Pratone and was organizing the mountain for defense.

The final attack on Altuzzo

The final attack on Altuzzo had been delayed briefly to allow the elements of the 91st Division on the left to seize Monticelli. In the early morning of the 17th, the positions on the crest of Altuzzo were consolidated. Fonte Freddo, a high point across the road and northwest of Altuzzo, was still holding out and fire from this area was harassing our troops, but during the night the remaining high points were seized. The Gothic Line had now been conquered along the entire Division front.

Towards the end, more and more of the enemy gave themselves up—some because they knew they were surrounded and cut off from help; some because they had run out of ammunition and food. By noon of the 18th, 231 prisoners had been taken, and in the next two days as many more were captured. The number of casualties was even greater. The enemy dead were scattered over the mountains.

After fighting five days against a wall of defenses, it was with a solid sense of accomplishment that the troops prepared to continue the attack. For weeks they had heard about the Gothic Line, and their thoughts and feelings had been intent on breaching it. They now had satisfaction in the knowledge that they had taken part in the conquest of another of the enemy's most carefully planned defensive systems.


2. Minturno to the Appennines. 85th Infantry Divisione, published by Information – Education Section – Mtousa – Produced by Headquarters – 85th Infantry Division. Passed by Field Press Censor and may be mailed home. It is an 88-page booklet published by the 85th Division during the final months of the war, intended for distribution to soldiers and their families. This booklet provides a good overview of the history of the 85th Divisione “Custer”. It contains information on places and events without going into specific details. The booklet breaks off with the fighting at Formiche and Monterenzio on November 22, 1944, likely so it could be published and distributed to the soldiers. A supplement exists that continues the history until the end of the war in May 1945, but it remained in manuscript form. This 88-page booklet contains maps or photographs nearly every other page. The photographs are of poor quality as the booklet was printed on newsprint.

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