1941-1943: the Russian Campaign of the Italian Army

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1941 The beginning of the Russian Campaign

Il 22 giugno 1941 la Germania invase l’URSS. I motivi dell’attacco erano sia ideologici sia strategici. Da una parte si voleva perseguire la lotta al comunismo e la conquista dello Spazio Vitale (Lebensraum) dall’altra Hitler era convinto che Stalin stesse tramando un attacco a sorpresa contro la Germania e con l’Operazione Barbarossa intendeva anticiparlo. In realtà non era così.

L’offensiva contro l’URSS fu scatenata su un fronte molto ampio: dal circolo polare al Mar Nero. Tre erano le direttrici principali: Nord con obiettivo Leningrado, Centro con obiettivo Mosca, sud con obiettivo Kiev. L’esercito tedesco era grande, ma non abbastanza. Fu necessario quindi ricorrere all’aiuto degli alleati: la Romania, l’Ungheria, la Finlandia, perfino la Slovacchia inviarono dei corpi di spedizione. Altri paesi come Spagna e Portogallo permisero ai loro cittadini di militare come volontari nella Wehrmacht, furono inoltre reclutati molti cittadini sovietici anticomunisti che formarono intere divisioni dell’esercito e delle Waffen-SS (Lettoni, Estoni, Lituani, Ucraini, Cosacchi ecc.).

Operazione Barbarossa - Giugno 1941

L’Italia contribuì quasi da subito con il CSIR (Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia), formato da 3 divisioni più vari reparti di Corpo d’Armata, per un totale di circa 62.000 uomini, che giunse nel sud della Russia nell’agosto del 1941. Lo comandava il generale Giovanni Messe, uno dei migliori comandanti italiani del tempo. Il CSIR diede una buona prova, tanto che i Tedeschi chiesero l’invio di altre truppe italiane.

Nel maggio del 1942 Mussolini decise la formazione di un nuovo Corpo di Spedizione, L’ARMIR, che divenne operativa in luglio. Erano 230.000 uomini in tutto divisi in 3 Corpi d’Armata di cui uno Alpino, comandati dal generale Italo Gariboldi. Il CSIR venne rinominato XXXV Corpo d’Armata e fu inglobato nell’ARMIR.

Oltre alle forze di terra, in Russia operarono anche un Corpo Aereo della Regia Aeronautica (con aerei da caccia, ricognizione e trasporto), e un contingente navale della Regia Marina formato da Mas, sommergibili tascabili ed altre piccole unità, che inviato sul Mar Nero ottenne diversi successi contro il naviglio sovietico.

Nel frattempo l’avanzata delle Forze dell’Asse nel sud della Russia aveva subito una battuta d’arresto. I Sovietici erano riusciti ad accumulare notevoli riserve ed a sferrare, a partire dall’agosto 1942, delle controffensive che avevano messo in crisi l’intero settore. L’ARMIR, schierata tra l’Armata Ungherese a nord e l’Armata Rumena a sud, arrestò gli attacchi al prezzo di gravi perdite. Fino a novembre la situazione rimase pressoché immutata, con le truppe italiane attestate su un fronte di 270 km allestito con opere difensive simili a quelle della Grande Guerra.

Il 19 novembre 1942 l’Armata Rossa lanciò una massiccia offensiva volta ad accerchiare la 6ª Armata tedesca impegnata a Stalingrado. L’azione portò anche all’annientamento dell’ Armata romena, schierata a sud-est dell’ARMIR. In tal modo gli Italiani rimasero pericolosamente esposti a nuove possibili manovre nemiche.

On December 16 another Soviet offensive (Operation Little Saturn) was unleashed against the central sector of the Italian front. The first attack was repulsed, but on December 17 the Russians employed their armored troops and air force, overwhelming the defenders and forcing them to retreat. The objective of the great Soviet maneuver was to join behind the Italian-German-Romanian deployment the two arms of a pincer, formed by powerful armored groups. On December 21, the two Russian columns from the north and east met at Degtevo, effectively closing the Italian XXXV Army Corps and the German XXIX Army Corps in an immense pocket. Almost without means of transportation, forced to wander on foot in search of a way out, the infantry divisions of the ARMIR ended up largely annihilated, mowed down by hunger, polar cold, and attacks by enemy armored columns and partisan units acting behind them.

On January 12, 1943, the Soviets kicked off the second phase of the offensive, overwhelming the Hungarian Army, deployed north of the Alpine Army Corps. The Alpine Army Corps remained locked in a pocket that included the Vicenza Division. The order to fall back from the Don was not given until January 17, much delayed.

During the retreat, Axis troops (particularly Italians but also Hungarians and Germans) marching westward found their way blocked by large Soviet forces that had barricaded themselves in the village of Nikolajevka. The only unit left relatively intact and still able to fight was the Tridentine Alpine Division. With a desperate attack led by division commander General Reverberi (MOVM), the Alpines managed to get the better of a much better equipped enemy, albeit at the cost of heavy losses. The Alpines succeeded in the miracle, even going so far as to take prisoners, capture fourteen cannons and reuse them against the Russians. Countless were the acts of heroism, and many were the decorations for valor that were awarded; an epic battle, which cost the lives of a great many Alpine men. Thus it was that some 20,000 men, including more than 7,000 wounded or frozen, managed to get out of the pocket and reach the friendly lines at Scebekino on January 31. Of the 4 divisions, only one, the Tridentine, had managed to remain intact overall, albeit severely bloodied. Of the others, only a few thousand men, mostly stragglers, managed to return.

With the substantial destruction of the ARMIR the Italian participation in the campaign on the Eastern Front effectively came to an end. Only a few smaller units remained operational, reporting directly to the Wehrmacht. The CSIR in the initial stages of the Russian campaign had over 1,600 killed, 5,300 wounded, over 400 missing and over 3,600 frozen. Between July 30, 1942 and December 10, 1942, the ARMIR had 3,216 dead and missing and 5,734 wounded and frozen. As for losses during the battle on the Don and the retreat, official figures speak of 84,830 soldiers who did not return to the German lines and were listed as missing, in addition to 29,690 wounded and frozen who managed to return. Losses thus amounted to 114,520 military personnel out of 230,000. It is difficult to say how many fell in the fighting and how many were captured and sent to prison camps; the fact remains that of the 84,830 missing only 10,030 made it back to Italy after the war.

The defeats of the Southern Front at Stalingrad and on the Don signaled the beginning of the end of Nazi hegemony in Europe. The Red Army continued to advance and liberate the territories that had been occupied by the Germans. Two years later, at the cost of millions of deaths, it reached Berlin.

Germany's Allies on the Eastern Front

Il fronte russo è stato indiscutibilmente il campo di battaglia più esteso in tutte le guerra combattute dall’uomo nella storia: si estendeva praticamente senza soluzione di continuità dal Circolo Polare Artico al Mar Nero, per una lunghezza che al suo apice raggiunse poco meno di 3000 chilometri.
Una simile vastità richiese l’impiego di una enorme quantità di uomini, soprattutto nelle fasi difensive della campagna. La Wehrmacht, già impegnata come forza d’occupazione in mezza Europa e con un corpo di spedizione combattente in Nord Africa, ebbe grande difficoltà a schierare un numero sufficiente di uomini. Per questa ragione attorno alla Germania fu costituita una vera e propria forza multinazionale rivolta a recuperare uomini per combattere il comune nemico sovietico.

This force was extremely heterogeneous, comprising both independent states with autonomous expeditionary corps (Romania, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria, Slovakia) and foreign volunteers incorporated into the Wehrmacht from the most diverse backgrounds: Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Cossacks, Walloons, Flemish, Dutch, Croatians, even Spanish and Portuguese, the latter two included in the famous Blue Division of the German army. As diverse was the origin of these men as could be the motivations that drove entire nations or individual volunteers to leave for Russia: the defense of national territory (Finland) or its liberation from the Soviets (for the Baltic states), political calculation, the obligation to comply with an alliance pact, or even to fight Bolshevism as in the case of many Central European and Scandinavian volunteers who enlisted in the Waffen-SS.

Equipment and training could also vary greatly, but both were generally far below German standards. In some cases, the most dramatic ones, contingents from Allied countries were partially or fully re-equipped with German-supplied weapons and equipment. As for the volunteers incorporated into the Wehrmacht, in the vast majority they were employed as militarized workers or with garrison duties in the rear, however, on several occasions they were organized into autonomous military units with the troop consisting of members of a certain ethnicity and with non-commissioned officers and officers at least partly German. In addition to the aforementioned Spanish division, the Croatian Legion and various other formations incorporated into the German army, many other “ethnic” units made up of Latvians, Estonians, Flemish and Dutchmen, to name but a few, fought in the Waffen-SS. In all of these cases the men were equipped and armed with German (or wartime prey) equipment and carried insignia distinctive of their origin.

Operation "Barbarossa"

Il 22 giugno 1941 la Wehrmacht attaccò la Russia su un fronte larghissimo. L’Armata Rossa fu colta di sorpresa, così come tutta la dirigenza sovietica. Obiettivo dell’operazione era la conquista della parte europea dell’URSS con le sue città principali (soprattutto Mosca) e le aree industriali e minerarie, oltre alla distruzione delle forze armate viste da sempre come una grave minaccia per la Germania.

L’attacco fu condotto da tre gruppi di Armate (denominate Nord, Centro, Sud) per un totale di 146 divisioni. L’Armata Rossa era molto più grande ma male organizzata, schierata e comandata. Solo nei primi dieci giorni furono spazzate via 40 divisioni con 300.000 uomini, ed immense quantità di armi e mezzi. La quantità di prigionieri caduti in mano tedesca fu tale che in alcuni casi rallentarono l’avanzata verso oriente. Il 26 settembre cadde Kiev, e ciò costò ai Russi 5 armate e un milione di uomini, tra cui circa 600.000 prigionieri.

The advance continued unstoppably for months: very heavy losses were inflicted and vast territories were conquered. Fatigue and attrition began to set in, however: the supply lines had stretched out of proportion, and strong contingents had to be left to garrison the occupied areas. The rapid advance had in fact left entire regular units of the Soviet army behind the lines: aided by the local population these had formed dangerous partisan formations that attacked the Wehrmacht from behind. Moreover, a very cold winter was inexorably approaching and the Red Army was reorganizing and strengthening. The German offensive momentum toward Moscow died down at the end of 1941, when the Wehrmacht units that had pushed further forward were stopped thirty kilometers from the capital. In the north, on the other hand, the advance was halted in front of Leningrad, while in the south the advance proceeded for a few more months, finally coming to a halt after the capture of Stalingrad in the fall of 1942.

The CSIR

Following the invasion of the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa, Mussolini decided to send an Italian Expeditionary Corps to aid the German ally. With this gesture he intended to restore a balance in the alliance with Germany after the aid received in Greece and North Africa. Moreover, he thought that a military commitment would allow for greater gains at the peace negotiating table, a similar reasoning to the one that had brought our country into the war the previous year.

The best available units were chosen for the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia: the Duce did not want to disfigure himself before the Fuehrer and had to demonstrate the strength and efficiency of the Regio Esercito. Equivalent in size to an Army Corps, the CSIR was made up of the self-transportable infantry divisions “Pasubio” and “Torino” and the celere division “Principe Amedeo Duca d'Aosta”; three divisions in all, plus a few units reporting directly to the Command for a total of about 62,000 men with 220 artillery pieces, 60 armored vehicles and an air component consisting of about 85 aircraft. There were 5,500 trucks available and enough to transport one division at a time.

THE CSIR arrived in Russia by train after a very long journey, and became operational within the German 11th Army in August 1941, first with Pasubio and then gradually with other units as they came on line. Because of the chronic lack of vehicles, however, some units had to reach the front on foot, as in Napoleon's time.

The Italians made a small but valuable contribution to the advance of the Axis forces into southern Russia. Despite limited means, they captured towns and took prisoners, earning the respect of the Allies. The advance came to a halt in late November as a very cold winter approached. The positions they had conquered were consolidated and they waited for the warm season. In the meantime, the Russians unleashed some offensives, which, however, were halted, not without some difficulty. Between January and March 1942 the CSIR received some reinforcement units: the Alpine Ski Battalion “Monte Cervino,” the’6th Bersaglieri Regiment and the 120th Artillery Regiment, and in June it came under the command of the 14th Army. In August it was renamed XXXV Army Corps and assigned to ARMIR, whose fate it would follow. Up to that time the CSIR had had over 1,600 killed, 5,300 wounded, over 400 missing and over 3,600 frozen.

Units belonging to the C.S.I.R.

  • 30th Army Corps Artillery Regiment
  • Legion CC. NN. Cutting
  • CIV Machine Gun Battalion of C. A.
  • II Anti-Tank Battalion 47/32
  • 1st motorcycle bersaglieri company
  • 4th Artillery Engineering Battalion
  • 1st and 9th Bridge Engineering Battalion
  • VIII Engineer Liaison Battalion
  • 1st Chemical Battalion
  • 82nd salmerie department
  • 2nd Army Self-Grouping

9th Infantry Division “Pasubio”

  • 79th Infantry Regiment
  • 80th Infantry Regiment
  • 8th Motorized Artillery Regiment

52nd Infantry Division “Turin”

  • 81st Infantry Regiment
  • 82nd Infantry Regiment
  • 52nd Motorized Artillery Regiment

3rd Celere Division “Prince Amedeo Duca d'Aosta”

  • 3rd Bersaglieri Regiment
  • Savoy Cavalry Regiment (until 3/15/1942)
  • Novara Lancer Regiment (until 3/15/1942)
  • 3rd Horse Artillery Regiment (until 3/15/1942)
  • 6th Bersaglieri Regiment (beginning 3/15/1942)
  • 120th Motorized Artillery Regiment (beginning 3/15/1942)

CSIR AVIATION COMMAND

  • 22nd Autonomous Terrestrial Fighter Group (out of 4 squadrons).
  • 61st Autonomous Air Observation Group (out of three squadrons)
  • Transport section (on two squadrons)

The ARMIR

Nel maggio 1942 Mussolini decise che il contributo italiano in Russia doveva essere potenziato. Il Generale Messe si oppose fermamente all’idea: preferiva un corpo di spedizione piccolo ma con grande mobilità, ben equipaggiato e addestrato, a una grande armata dotata di mezzi insufficienti e inadeguati. Il Duce fu irremovibile: secondo il suo punto di vista l’ARMIR avrebbe avuto tutto un altro peso rispetto al CSIR sul tavolo delle trattative di pace. Anche per questo contrasto Messe non ricevette il comando della nuova armata, che fu assegnata al generale Italo Gariboldi, ma rimase in Russia con il suo CSIR, ridenominato con l’occasione XXXV Corpo d’Armata.

The ARMIR, Italian Army in Russia, became operational from July 1942. It was composed of, in addition to the CSIR units already deployed, the Alpine Army Corps with three divisions (Tridentina, Julia and Cuneense) and the II Army Corps with three infantry divisions (Sforzesca, Ravenna and Cosseria). Then there was the Vicenza Division, the Barbò mounted grouping and numerous other smaller units directly subordinate to the Army Command, totaling about 230,000 men with over 20,000 vehicles, 25,000 quadrupeds and 940 guns.

The first operational actions fell to the Tridentine in late August. It was at this time that ARMIR was placed under the German Army Group B and was assigned to protect the left flank of the forces engaged in the Battle of Stalingrad. It deployed along the Don Basin between the Hungarian 2nd Army in the north and the German 6th Army (replaced in late September by the Romanian 3rd Army) in the south. Between August 20, 1942, and September 1, Soviet troops unleashed a major offensive against the Hungarian, German, and Italian units (which bore the brunt of the attack) deployed in the northern bend of the Don. The offensive was halted, albeit with difficulty and suffering heavy losses. Especially the Sforzesca, which was overwhelmed by as many as three enemy divisions, was decimated. On this occasion many units intervened to help the struggling infantry division, and the Italian cavalry carried out numerous charges against the Russians, among which legendary remained that of the Savoia at  Ishbuschensky. September and October passed in relative tranquility, with Italian troops arranged to defend a stretch of frontline about 270 km long.

On November 19, the Red Army had launched a massive offensive aimed at encircling the German 6th Army engaged in Stalingrad. The action also led to the annihilation of the Romanian 3rd Army, deployed southeast of ARMIR. At dawn on December 16, another Soviet offensive (Operation Little Saturn) was unleashed against the lines held by II Army Corps, which held the central sector of the Italian front. The plan did not take the Italian units by surprise, as skirmishes and minor clashes had been going on along the front since December 11. The first attack was repulsed, but on December 17 the Soviets employed their armored troops and aviation, overwhelming the Ravenna lines and forcing it to retreat. The goal of the major Soviet maneuver was to join the two arms of the pincer, consisting of powerful armored groups, behind the Italian-German-Romanian deployment. Gariboldi tried to plug the various gaps by moving divisions where necessary, but the unannounced retreat of the Germanic 298th Division, positioned in the center of the deployment, made the situation even more dramatic. On December 21, the two Russian columns from the north and east met at Degtevo, effectively closing the Italian XXXV Army Corps and the German XXIX Army Corps in an immense pocket.

Almost deprived of transportation, forced to wander on foot in search of a way out, the infantry divisions of the ARMIR largely ended up annihilated, mowed down by hunger, polar cold, and attacks by enemy armored columns and partisan divisions acting behind them.

The Soviet offensive did not involve the Alpine Army Corps for the time being, which continued to hold its positions on the Don. The Julia bled into continuous fighting to hold the front. Meanwhile, the Red Army was preparing for the second phase of the breakthrough: the great Russian river, now covered with hardy ice and thus passable even for tanks, was no longer that great natural obstacle that had so valiantly protected the Alpine troops until then.

On January 12, 1943, the Soviets kicked off the second phase of the offensive, overwhelming the Hungarian 2nd Army, deployed north of the Alpine Army Corps. The following day they invested the remnants of the Italian infantry deployed along with the German XXIV Army Corps. The Alpine Army Corps remained enclosed in a pocket that included not only the three Alpine troops but also the Vicenza Division. The order to fall back from the Don was not given until January 17, very late. Of the four divisions, only one, the Tridentine, managed to break through the encirclement, albeit severely bloodied. Of the other units only a few thousand men, mostly stragglers, managed to return.

Con la sostanziale distruzione dell’ARMIR ebbe di fatto termine la partecipazione italiana alla campagna sul fronte orientale. Solo poche unità minori rimasero operative, alle dipendenze dirette della Wehrmacht. Tra il 30 luglio 1942 e il 10 dicembre 1942 l’ARMIR ebbe 3.216 morti e dispersi e 5.734 fra feriti e congelati. Per quanto riguarda le perdite durante la battaglia sul Don e la ritirata, le cifre ufficiali parlano di 84.830 militari che non rientrarono nelle linee tedesche, e che furono indicati come dispersi, oltre a 29.690 feriti e congelati che riuscirono a rientrare. Le perdite ammontarono quindi a 114 520 militari su 230 000. Difficile dire in quanti caddero nei combattimenti e quanti vennero catturati ed avviati ai campi di prigionia; resta il fatto che degli 84.830 dispersi  solo in 10.030 fecero ritorno in Italia dopo la guerra. Oltre alle gravi perdite umane, quasi tutto l’armamento fu lasciato sul campo: andarono perduti il 97% dei cannoni, il 76% di mortai e mitragliatrici, il 66% delle armi individuali, l’87% degli automezzi e l’80% dei quadrupedi.

The Alpine troops in Russia

The figure of the Alpine soldier is inextricably linked to the Russian campaign. Although with the CSIR and ARMIR there were also infantrymen, bersaglieri, cavalrymen, sappers, and artillerymen, the figure of the soldier with the felt hat, feather, and snow-covered coat marching across the boundless steppe has become an icon in the collective imagination.

The first Alpine troops arrived in Russia in February 1942: it was a ski battalion, the Matterhorn, which was sent to reinforce the CSIR. However, the bulk arrived with the Alpine Army Corps, which came on line along with ARMIR in July and had a force of about fifty-seven thousand men selected and trained to operate in mountainous and rugged terrain. Formed of three divisions, the Tridentina, Julia, and Cuneense, the Alpine Army Corps had been formed with the idea of employing it in the Caucasus mountains. In reality, the only thing the Alpines would find familiar in the steppe would be snow.

Le tre divisioni alpine furono schierate lungo le sponde del Don, sull’ala sinistra del settore di competenza dell’ARMIR e a fianco della II Armata ungherese: dovevano tenere un fronte lungo ben 70 chilometri. In autunno si lavorò alacremente per rinforzare e rendere il più confortevoli possibili le postazioni difensive in previsione dell’imminente arrivo dell’inverno. I lavori furono ottimi per tenere impegnati gli uomini, ma le opere realizzate si rivelarono di scarsa utilità: il 15 dicembre i Sovietici sfondarono altrove e accerchiarono gli Italiani. Inizialmente gli alpini mantennero le posizioni, ricacciando gli assalitori da ogni direzione questi attaccassero, poi, ricevuto l’ordine di ripiegare per evitare l’annientamento, dopo un mese di aspri combattimenti il 15 gennaio 1943 iniziarono la ritirata. A questo punto solo la Tridentina era rimasta efficiente ed in grado di combattere. I resti della Cuneense e della Julia rimasero indietro ed il 27 gennaio furono quasi totalmente catturate assieme a quanto rimaneva della divisione Vicenza a Waluiki. La Tridentina invece riuscì a sfondare la sacca a Nikolajewka, seppure con perdite gravissime.

Dopo una marcia di 200 chilometri nella neve durata 15 giorni e costellata di innumerevoli combattimenti, i superstiti raggiunsero finalmente le linee amiche. Il 31 gennaio i resti del del Corpo d’Armata alpino giunsero a Schebekino. I feriti gravi vennero avviati ai vari ospedali, alcuni furono caricati su un treno ospedale per il rimpatrio. Gli uomini ancora in grado di farlo si rimisero in cammino e giunsero a Gomel il primo di marzo, dopo una lunga marcia nella neve ed a temperature costantemente sotto lo zero.

Alpine units effective in Russia Campaign

Alle dipendenze del Comando d’Armata:

  • Battaglione alpini sciatori “Monte Cervino”

Alle dipendenze del Corpo d’Armata alpino:

  • 2ª Divisione alpina “Tridentina”
    • 5º Reggimento alpini
    • Morbegno Battalion
    • Tirano Battalion
    • Edolo Battalion
    • 6º Reggimento alpini
    • Vestone Battalion
    • Val Chiese Battalion
    • Verona Battalion
    • 2º Reggimento artiglieria alpina
    • Bergamo Group
    • Vicenza Group
    • Val Camonica Group
  • 3ª Divisione alpina “Julia”
    • 8º Reggimento alpini
    • Tolmezzo Battalion
    • Gemona Battalion
    • Cividale Battalion
    • 9º Reggimento alpini
    • Vicenza Battalion
    • Battaglione L’Aquila
    • Val Cismon Battalion
    • 3º Reggimento artiglieria alpina
    • Conegliano Group
    • Udine Group
    • Val Piave Group
  • 4ª Divisione alpina “Cuneense”
    • 1º Reggimento alpini
    • Ceva Battalion
    • Pieve di Teco Battalion
    • Battaglione Mondovì
    • 2º Reggimento alpini
    • Borgo San Dalmazzo Battalion
    • Dronero Battalion
    • Saluzzo Battalion
    • 4º Reggimento artiglieria alpina
    • Pinerolo Group
    • Gruppo Mondovì
    • Val Po Group

The Russian Red Army

Nel 1941 i cittadini sovietici idonei al servizio militare obbligatorio erano circa 25 milioni. La leva aveva una durata di due anni e l’addestramento era molto approssimativo. Inizialmente l’esercito regolare comprendeva circa 9 milioni di uomini di cui quasi la metà schierata nella parte occidentale dell’URSS. L’Operazione Barbarossa sorprese l’Armata Rossa in piena fase di riorganizzazione, dopo le gravi lacune venute alla luce durante la Guerra d’Inverno contro la Finlandia.

L’attacco colse l’esercito sovietico totalmente impreparato: in pochi mesi subì perdite devastanti, nell’ordine dei milioni di uomini morti o prigionieri. Mentre la Wehrmacht era in piena avanzata, fu creato uno Stato Maggiore Generale (Stavka) sotto il diretto controllo di Stalin. Lo Stavka mise i distretti militari sotto un controllo politico centralizzato e poté organizzare con estrema efficacia lo sfruttamento delle risorse nazionali; tuttavia la sua funzione principale fu quella di coordinare tutte le forze in Unione Sovietica. Nel contempo, si iniziarono ad accantonare riserve strategiche destinate ai contrattacchi da sferrare non appena se ne fosse presentata l’opportunità.

Nel 1941 l’esercito sovietico era organizzata in armate formate da circa 12 divisioni, per un totale che poteva superare i 200.000 uomini; successivamente, per renderle più maneggevoli, la loro consistenza fu ridotta a 8 divisioni. Con il procedere della guerra l’Armata Rossa si ingrandì sempre di più, tanto che nel 1944 le Armate schierate dal Baltico al mar Nero erano ben 48. La grande unità di base dell’Armata Rossa era la divisione fucilieri. Dopo le dure lezioni degli inizi, le sue dimensioni vennero ridotte, ma ne venne accresciuta la potenza di fuoco: vennero aumentate le dotazioni di mortai e cannoni, ma soprattutto ben 2000 uomini vennero dotati di mitra, efficacissimi nei combattimenti ravvicinati. La “punta di lancia” era costituita dalle truppe corazzate, che a partire dal 1943 vennero racchiuse in armate. Anche l’artiglieria, a parte le unità divisionali che avevano scarso valore, era concentrata in divisioni specializzate.

A differenza della maggioranza degli eserciti che combatterono nella seconda guerra mondiale, il sistema dei rimpiazzi non era previsto. L’unità che subiva perdite in battaglia non riceveva rinforzi dalle retrovie ma continuava a combattere fino al totale annientamento o fino a che non veniva ritirata dal fronte per essere sciolta o ricostituita. Le reclute costituivano nuove divisioni che venivano inviate al fronte a ranghi completi. Il risultato di questa politica è che una divisione di nome, se in linea da molto tempo, poteva avere grande esperienza ma la forza di un reggimento o anche meno.

Un’altra caratteristica dell’Armata Rossa era la presenza di unità della “Guardia”: si trattava questo di un titolo onorifico concesso a quei reparti che si erano particolarmente distinti sul campo. In pratica si trattava di unità d’élite, che in quanto tali, ricevevano anche un equipaggiamento migliore. Il grado di efficienza di una divisione della Guardia era considerato pari a quello di una divisione di fanteria tedesca.

The supply service was rather poor, and there was a chronic lack of motor vehicles. This problem was partly overcome by Anglo-American aid, which contributed half a million motor vehicles starting from 1943.

E’ stato calcolato che durante la seconda guerra mondiale siano morti 13.700.000 soldati sovietici.

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