"Break-Through at Monte Altuzzo" nel racconto di Sidney T. Mathews

edited by Daniele Baggiani

We provide here in download (on the right; below the text if using a smartphone) the complete original text and the Italian translation of an important book regarding the breakthrough of the Gothic Line at the Giogo Pass in Scarperia which, in particular, explores the Battle of Monte Altuzzo step by step. It is:

C.B. MACDONALD, S.T. MATHEWS, Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt. The United States Army in World War II, Washington DC, Office of the Chief of Military History. Department of the Army, 1952.

This text derives its historical importance from two fundamental aspects:

First of all, it is based on valuable direct accounts gathered through interviews with the soldiers who took part in the fighting that occurred between September 12 and 18, 1944, for the capture of Hill 926, Monte Altuzzo. These interviews make it possible to accurately reconstruct the course of the clashes on the ground and the dynamics experienced by the men on the front line, integrating and expanding upon what emerged from official documents.
Secondly, it lucidly analyzes the tactical choices and the operational evolution of one of the most significant battles fought along the Gothic Line. The attack on Monte Altuzzo, conducted under conditions of extreme environmental and tactical difficulty, clearly demonstrates the problems faced by American troops: the rugged and uneven terrain, precarious communications, loss of orientation, and deadly friendly fire errors. The analysis thus highlights the tenacious German resistance, favored by a skillful defensive arrangement along prepared fortified lines, which significantly increased the human and material costs sustained by the Allies in the capture of Hill 926, a key point of the Gothic Line.

The volume examines with extreme accuracy three battles faced by the United States Army during World War II, focusing on operations conducted in September 1944 at Arnaville, Monte Altuzzo, and Schmidt. Each of these clashes was characterized by a high toll of human lives and complex tactical challenges for the American troops. The importance of these battles lies not only in the strategic outcome achieved, but above all in the operational lessons that emerged from them, contributing to improving the training and tactical capabilities of the United States infantry.

On the Italian front, the 338th Infantry Regiment was engaged in one of the most difficult breakthrough operations of the Gothic Line, specifically on Monte Altuzzo, a sector of crucial strategic relevance. The clashes, fought between September 12 and 18, 1944, featured units of the 85th Infantry Division "Custer," which had to face extremely hostile terrain, heavily fortified German defensive positions, and a series of logistical, communication, and tactical difficulties that complicated the advance from the very first hours of the offensive.

This work offers a broad and detailed summary of the volume's content, making it accessible as a standalone read. Furthermore, we provide the formatted PDF files of the section dedicated to the Battle of Monte Altuzzo, including notes, photographs, maps, and a specific bibliography. The monumental research work conducted by the author testifies to the care with which the American army studied the most complex clashes to draw valuable lessons for the future. A heartfelt thanks to Sidney T. Mathews for providing such a detailed and accurate reconstruction of the breakthrough of the Gothic Line by the 338th Infantry Regiment of the 85th "Custer" Division – a success shared with the 363rd Infantry Regiment of the 91st "Powder River" Division, which fought heroically on Monticelli Ridge, west of the Giogo Pass.

12-13 September 1944: preparations at the Paretaio Farm

The 338th Infantry Regiment, part of the American 85th Infantry Division under the command of General John B. Coulter, arrived in the area in front of Monte Altuzzo during the night between September 12 and 13, 1944. The Paretaio Farm, located in the immediate vicinity of the road leading to the Giogo Pass, became the assembly and concentration point for the forces. In these early hours, crucial for the future course of the battle, the officers devoted themselves to the detailed planning of operations. In command of the 1st Battalion, the unit that would play the primary role in the direct assault on the summit of Monte Altuzzo (Hill 926), was Lieutenant Colonel Willis O. Jackson, an energetic and determined officer. Jackson had received a direct order from the 85th Division command: to capture the peak of Monte Altuzzo, a key point of the Gothic Line defended by the German 12th Parachute Regiment, in order to create a decisive breach in the enemy defenses.

The Paretaio Farm soon became a frantic logistical hub, where supplies, ammunition, and equipment were stockpiled. It was here that K-rations, grenades, and extra ammunition were distributed to the soldiers. The men, many of whom had already fought hard in the preceding weeks, took advantage of these hours to rest briefly and carefully check their equipment. Some officers and experienced soldiers, such as Sergeant Lang and Sergeant Kelsey, reviewed their squads, providing detailed instructions on the tactics to be employed in the rugged and mountainous terrain.

During the preparations, Lieutenant Colonel Jackson held numerous tactical briefings with the company commanders to clearly define each unit's tasks. The plan called for the B Company. commanded by Captain Maurice E. Peabody, to take the lead of the main attack along the eastern ridge of Monte Altuzzo, with the primary objective of occupying the summit (Hill 926). Meanwhile, the A Company, under the command of Captain King, would operate on the western ridge with the task of protecting the left flank of the main assault, preventing any enemy counterattacks from the western slope. The C Company, under the command of Captain Palumbo, would instead maintain the initial reserve, ready to intervene in support of Company B as soon as it reached intermediate objectives.

Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, aware of the objective's difficulty, warned the company commanders about the pitfalls along the route: extensive barbed wire zones, expertly hidden minefields, and well-camouflaged German bunkers.

Despite these precautions, detailed information about the terrain was scarce, and the poor night visibility and uncertain weather did not help in clearly identifying the critical points they would encounter. This would later cause severe orientation problems during the assault.

Particular attention was paid to the communication system: each company was equipped with SCR 536 radios, but these devices immediately proved inadequate for the operational needs that would arise on the rugged terrain of Monte Altuzzo. Despite this, several messenger squads were organized to compensate for any difficulties in radio transmissions.

Throughout the day of September 13th, before the scheduled departure that night, senior officers from the regiment and division repeatedly visited Paretaio to check the state of preparations and motivate the men. The soldiers, aware of the operation's difficulty, took advantage of these hours to write letters home or rest briefly. For many of them, these would be the last hours of tranquility before extremely harsh and bloody days. Toward evening, just before the battalion set out on its mission, a heavy American artillery bombardment struck the Monte Altuzzo area to weaken the German defenses. However, due to calculation errors, part of this fire fell too close to the initial positions of the 338th Infantry, causing some tense situations among the soldiers already poised to advance. Despite this episode, morale remained high and determination firm: the men were ready to move toward the jump-off positions on the ridge, confident in the imminent success.

Thus, with darkness now completely fallen, the 1st Battalion slowly and silently began the movement from the Paretaio Farm toward the initial slopes of Monte Altuzzo, unaware of the severe orientation problems and the losses it would encounter just a few hours later.

14 settembre 1944: orientation errors and communication limitations

In the early hours of September 14, 1944, the 1st Battalion of the 338th Infantry Regiment, under the direct command of Lieutenant Colonel Willis O. Jackson, launched a decisive attack toward what they believed to be the strategic summit of Monte Altuzzo (Hill 926). The advance, however, began under an unlucky star. The configuration of the mountain terrain, characterized by steep ridges, dense wooded areas, and numerous rocky outcrops, immediately hindered the men's correct orientation, slowing their movement and making it almost impossible to maintain a coherent formation. Company B, commanded by Captain Maurice E. Peabody, moved with great difficulty through paths that were not clearly recognizable, in conditions of poor visibility.

In an attempt to advance rapidly toward the summit, the soldiers of the Company got lost, making a crucial orientation error: instead of heading toward the main peak of Monte Altuzzo, they mistakenly reached a secondary ridge located about 700 meters west of the designated objective. The soldiers subsequently gave this ridge the informal name of "Peabody’s Peak."

Here they immediately encountered insidious obstacles carefully prepared by the Germans: dense barbed wire barriers interrupted by well-camouflaged minefields, which forced the men to proceed extremely slowly, further exposing themselves to enemy machine-gun and mortar fire. As they advanced over the rocks, the soldiers discovered that digging adequate shelters was impossible, given the hardness of the ground: many managed to create only shallow trenches, barely sufficient to cover their bodies lying on the ground.

Radio communications between the company and battalion command soon collapsed due to interference, malfunctions of the SCR 536 devices, and batteries exhausted after an entire night of operations. Sergeant Lang, commander of the 2nd Platoon, realizing the gravity of the situation and the exposed position of his unit, repeatedly tried to request reinforcements and fire support via messengers. Numerous soldiers, including Private John E. Catlett and Private Patrick H. McDonald, Jr., were sent toward Captain Peabody’s command post to ask for ammunition and urgent relief. However, many of them failed to return, falling victim to German fire along the way.

The difficulties increased rapidly as the Germans launched repeated and violent counterattacks. The soldiers of Company B, already exhausted and low on ammunition, soon found themselves forced to use ammunition salvaged from fallen comrades to continue the fight. Private William C. Leonard Jr. was among the first casualties, mortally wounded during an intense German mortar bombardment. Numerous other men suffered severe wounds with no possibility of being evacuated due to the intensity of enemy fire and the hazardous nature of the terrain.

American artillery, in an attempt to support Company B, opened fire several times, but due to errors in identifying the position, some shells fell dangerously close to the American soldiers themselves. This dramatic situation caused further casualties and confusion among the troops. Lieutenant Erkman, the company executive officer, tried desperately to consolidate positions and recover the missing, but the chaos, the dispersal of the men, and the continuous fire severely hindered his actions.

Meanwhile, from the main summit of Monte Altuzzo, German machine guns continued throughout the entire day and part of the night to hammer the isolated American positions on the wrong ridge.

Some soldiers, such as Private Alton Mos, demonstrated great courage by managing to temporarily suppress an enemy mortar with rapid and precise bursts from their Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR). Others simply limited themselves to resisting with great difficulty, exposing themselves to enormous risks every time they attempted to return enemy fire.

During the night, the morale of the men of Company B was put to a severe test by the lack of information: only in the following hours would they fully understand the error committed, namely that they had positioned themselves on the wrong ridge. Until that moment, in fact, the American soldiers still believed they were near the main summit of Monte Altuzzo and were fighting for direct control of it. The misunderstanding was discovered only much later, after many hours of extremely harsh fighting and multiple sacrifices in terms of human lives.

At the end of the dramatic day, the toll for Company B was heavy: dozens of soldiers had been killed or seriously wounded, others were missing, and the position reached offered no real strategic advantage. However, the tenacious resistance of the soldiers had at least prevented the Germans from quickly reoccupying that secondary ridge, thus maintaining a useful position, even if it was not the one originally intended.

September 15: isolation, counterattacks, desperate resistance

September 15th began with the men of the 1st Battalion, particularly B Company, already deeply involved in a very delicate tactical situation. Isolated on the eastern flank of Monte Altuzzo, the soldiers found themselves in highly vulnerable positions, exposed to enemy fire coming from well-fortified positions and from areas not yet identified along the German defensive line. After the tragic confusion of the previous day, which had seen numerous errors in orientation and the determination of objectives, Captain Maurice E. Peabody, commander of B Company, continued to believe that his unit was near the main ridge of Monte Altuzzo, not realizing instead that they were established on a secondary position, further west, in the direction of the wrong ridge.

This error, still not clarified to higher command, provoked heavy tactical consequences: American artillery continued to fire on the incorrectly indicated objectives, at times even hitting the soldiers of Company B. This friendly fire caused casualties among the wounded who, unable to be evacuated, remained exposed without any adequate cover.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Lang, with the forward platoons (2nd and 3rd Platoons of Company B), found himself low on ammunition and without the possibility of resupply. Radio communication with company command had proven impossible: the batteries of the SCR 536 devices had been rapidly exhausted, making every attempt to request reinforcements or artillery support ineffective. In a now desperate situation, Lang decided to send several messengers to company command to urgently request help.

The first messengers sent, including Private John E. Catlett, encountered extremely grave difficulties. Catlett managed to reach Lieutenant Erkman (the Executive Officer of Company B), but the latter, in an attempt to climb the hill with reinforcements, was repelled by enemy fire and forced to turn back. Catlett himself remained pinned down by German machine-gun fire and was unable to return to his original position. During the day, other soldiers were sent as messengers, with tragic results. Private Donald J. Brown was killed while trying to reach command; his companion, Patrick H. McDonald Jr., after seeing Brown fall mortally wounded, continued the mission anyway, finally managing to reach the company commander, Captain Peabody, reporting the desperate situation of the forward platoons. Peabody guaranteed that he would send reinforcements immediately, but the attempts proved ineffective due to the heavy German fire that prevented the relief from reaching the forward positions.

German counterattacks against Company B's positions followed violently throughout the day. Each assault was preceded by intense 50-mm mortar bombardments and precise bursts of automatic weapons, forcing the American soldiers to take cover in improvised shelters, behind rocks, or in freshly dug holes. The attacks, launched mainly from the front and the right flank of the American positions, inflicted increasing casualties and forced the men to use their very last ammunition. During one of these clashes, Private Angelo F. Crespi, a radio operator for the 1st Platoon, was mortally wounded, leaving the platoon without any means of communication.

Despite the losses and desperate conditions, the American soldiers held the position with heroic determination, repeatedly repelling the enemy. The surviving soldiers recovered ammunition from the bodies of fallen comrades to continue fighting, as they were unable to receive any resupply.

Some of the wounded attempted to make their own way down toward the command post, crossing at enormous risk the minefield marked by the "Minen" sign placed by the Germans and the thick barbed wire. Several soldiers, including Private Hamilton Adams, were wounded while attempting to evacuate or deliver messages.

In the afternoon, the light and heavy machine guns of Company D's heavy weapons platoon attempted to position themselves in support of the forward platoons, but their effectiveness was minimal. The steep and rocky terrain conditions, combined with the presence of thick vegetation, made it impossible to find a placement that guaranteed both a clear view of the enemy and safe cover for the operators. In many cases, the machine gun crews were quickly hit as soon as they exposed themselves to fire. Finally, the 60-mm mortars never managed to reach forward positions, being pinned down throughout the day by precise machine-gun and rifle fire from the adjacent ridges. In summary, the main critical issues encountered on September 15th were:

Severe communication problems with command.
Chronic lack of ammunition and the impossibility of receiving resupplies.
Loss of orientation and failure to identify the real objective (Monte Altuzzo).
Friendly fire caused by errors in determining positions.
Inability to evacuate the seriously wounded due to the hostile nature of the terrain and continuous fire.

Despite these dramatic conditions, the 1st Battalion still managed to repel all German counterattacks, though suffering heavy losses in human lives and numerous wounded. By the end of the day, it was evident that a new strategy and a clear intervention of reinforcements would be necessary for the continuation of the operation.

September 16: consolidation of positions, further counterattacks

During the night and throughout the early hours of September 16, the situation of the 338th Infantry Regiment on the summit of Monte Altuzzo remained critical. The 1st Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel Willis O. Jackson, had reached forward positions on the eastern ridge of Monte Altuzzo (Hill 926), but these positions were extremely vulnerable, as the German defensive lines and bunkers located in the immediate vicinity of the summit had not yet been completely captured. During the day, Lieutenant Krasman, commander of the 3rd Platoon of Company C, and Sergeant Fent led an operation aimed at identifying and neutralizing the remaining enemy positions. Together with Private Schwantke, a company scout and German speaker, they discovered a camouflaged German post and began inspecting a complex system of zigzag trenches that connected the bunkers to the peak. While exploring a trench, they encountered a German soldier who, when called upon to surrender, attempted to flee and was immediately shot and killed.

The situation quickly became chaotic. Lieutenant Krasman requested reinforcements from the southern slope, and Sergeant Strosnider, with about fifteen men from Company C, moved rapidly toward the summit to reinforce the captured positions.

The men advanced as far as the right-hand zigzag trench but were stopped by fire from a German machine gun stationed in the right bunker. Private Schwantke repeatedly attempted to bypass the enemy fire but was constantly repelled. Lieutenant Krasman and Sergeant Thompson tried to neutralize the German threat with several hand grenades, but without evident results.

At the same time, Sergeant Strosnider and some soldiers from Company C took refuge in a large crater caused by artillery, from which they attempted to assault a nearby bunker that was well-protected and had no visible embrasures. The Germans began to respond with concussion grenades, which grazed the Americans but fortunately did not explode directly inside the crater.

In this phase of close-quarters combat, Private First Class Elmer J. Kunze and Private Lawrence Markey Jr. distinguished themselves by directly confronting a German soldier who had suddenly emerged from the bunker wearing an American helmet.

In the immediate confrontation, Markey hesitated to fire and the German managed to throw a grenade, forcing both Americans to temporarily retreat. They returned to the assault after receiving a grenade from Sergeant Strosnider, engaging in a further clash with the enemy in the bunker. In this intense close-quarters combat, Markey was wounded in the shoulder by a rifle shot and other men suffered casualties: Private Anthony W. Houston was killed by a burst of machine-gun fire coming from Knob 3, and Private First Class Kermit C. Fisher, in an attempt to assist Private Schwantke, was mortally wounded in the throat. Another significant action was conducted by Sergeant Fent along with Privates Kubina and Lightner on the left flank of the summit. They identified a bunker from which a German officer quickly emerged, who was immediately shot down by Fent. After further close-range clashes, Fent and Lightner managed to capture fourteen German prisoners, including a master sergeant who revealed the imminence of further German counterattacks. Subsequently, they captured another ten Germans who arrived voluntarily to surrender. During the search of the captured bunker, Fent and Lightner destroyed the radio and telephone equipment to prevent its use by the enemy in case of reoccupation.

In the afternoon, as predicted by the captured German master sergeant, German forces attempted their first decisive counterattack to retake the summit of Monte Altuzzo.

This counterattack, carried out with determination by the German soldiers, primarily employed 50-mm mortars and machine guns, placing the soldiers of Company C in grave difficulty. The American troops, despite severe difficulties with ammunition supply, nevertheless managed to resist effectively, ultimately repelling the enemy assault thanks to artillery fire and the use of small arms.

The day of September 16th was therefore characterized by fierce and continuous close-quarters combat with the enemy, fought primarily within the bunkers and trenches atop the summit of Monte Altuzzo. The casualties were heavy relative to the brief duration of the clashes, with several soldiers killed and many others seriously wounded during these close-range actions.

September 17: the capture of Altuzzo

At dawn on September 17, the 1st Battalion of the 338th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Willis O. Jackson, was finally positioned on the summit of Monte Altuzzo (Hill 926). However, the situation was far from stable. The German soldiers, though weakened, continued to firmly hold the main defenses on the upper part of the bowl and the western summit, making the American position precarious. Furthermore, small enemy pockets were still active in the bunkers and along the knoll north of Hill 926, from which they would soon launch a series of counterattacks.

The Germans, reinforced during the night by the 2nd Battalion of the Grenadier Lehr Brigade and Lithuanian replacements, decided to counterattack with determination.

Captain King's Company C was particularly exposed on Hill 926. Sergeant Strosnider's platoon saw a German squad approaching, armed with a machine gun; before they could fire, Strosnider managed to hit and kill the assistant gunner, causing the others to retreat. Almost immediately, intense fire from 50-mm mortars and machine guns struck the American positions. Private Bruce Cohn was wounded in the ankle by a .30 caliber bullet and then hit again in the back while seeking cover. In that moment, the American soldiers quickly ran out of ammunition and had to resort to using enemy grenades scavenged from the ground.

During the climax of the German attack, Lieutenant Ritchey, commander of Company C’s Weapons Platoon, ran toward the first bend of the right-hand zigzag trench with a machine gun, firing bursts at the advancing Germans, supported by the riflemen assisting him. However, the intensity of the enemy fire soon forced him to fall back to less exposed positions on the southern slope of the hill. On the left flank, the situation remained critical for the duration of the attack: a German machine gun incessantly targeted the men of Company C while the enemy attempted to outflank the American defensive line.

La Compagnia K, che tentava di avanzare verso Knob 3 a nord, subì numerose perdite a causa della resistenza tedesca ancora presente sul terreno. Il primo Plotone, diretto a est della cima di Quota 926, fu immediatamente fermato dal fuoco nemico proveniente dai bunker ancora presidiati dai tedeschi. Anche il 2° e il 3° Plotone, sebbene riusciti ad avanzare parzialmente verso Knob 3, vennero infine fermati e rischiarono di essere tagliati fuori e circondati.

Only the retreat order from the Company K commander, Lieutenant Mack L. Brooks, allowed the troops to avoid complete encirclement.

The retreat occurred just in time, because immediately afterward the Germans launched a further and more intense counterattack from both flanks. Lieutenant Brooks of Company K had his 60-mm mortars fire at close range in front of the American line, thereby managing to temporarily halt the German advance. The artillery of the 403rd Field Artillery Battalion also effectively supported the counter-counterattack, firing numerous rounds—277 in a single hour—onto the German positions north of the Monte Altuzzo summit. This combination of artillery fire, mortars, and small arms finally succeeded in decisively breaking the German counterattack.

In the course of the day's actions, the 1st Battalion suffered further casualties: 29 men fell (two killed and twenty-seven wounded), all belonging to Company C except for two wounded soldiers from Company A. The 3rd Battalion, involved in the clashes south of Hill 926 and in the attempted advance toward Knob 3, recorded 38 casualties: three soldiers killed, four missing, and thirty-one wounded. In total, during the actions to capture and defend Monte Altuzzo, including Knob 3, the 338th Regiment suffered 290 casualties, the majority of which were in the 1st Battalion.

Despite the losses sustained, the day of September 17 marked the definitive breakthrough of the main German line at Monte Altuzzo, paving the way for the final advance toward the Giogo Pass and beyond.

September 18: final counterattacks. The capture of Knob 3

On the morning of September 18, after a night spent consolidating positions, the 3rd Battalion of the 338th Infantry Regiment officially assumed responsibility for the defense of the summit of Monte Altuzzo, while simultaneously preparing to push north to capture Knob 3, the last German stronghold still under enemy control in the area. At the first light of day, a twenty-five-man patrol from Company K conducted a reconnaissance toward the German positions on the northern ridge of Monte Altuzzo. To their surprise, they discovered that the right-hand bunker, one of the most fortified German positions, had already been abandoned during the night. This news accelerated the organization of the final assault, and immediate orders were issued for Companies I and L to advance rapidly toward Knob 3.

During the night, however, Company I encountered serious difficulties in maintaining orientation in the darkness, which significantly slowed its advance. In contrast, Company L managed to depart on time, gaining ground toward Knob 3. There, they met initial opposition from a small German force entrenched on the summit. Despite tough initial resistance, the soldiers of Company L quickly neutralized three enemy heavy machine guns. Decisive to the success were several German prisoners captured during the assault, who pointed out the locations of two additional nearby bunkers to the American soldiers and directly assisted in the surrender of the occupants. In the action to capture and clear Knob 3, Company L captured sixty-four German soldiers, at a cost of two dead and one wounded among its men.

Poco dopo l’alba del 18 settembre, la conquista di Knob 3 era finalmente completata, segnando l’occupazione definitiva di Monte Altuzzo da parte delle forze americane.

During the same morning hours, the 2nd Battalion of the 338th Infantry, under the direct command of Colonel Willis O. Jackson, also consolidated the advance along the road connecting the Giogo Pass to Monticelli, strategically occupying the heights located north of the road. Simultaneously, Companies I and L of the 3rd Battalion continued their progression northward, finally reaching the village of Barco, situated approximately 1,600 meters north of the Giogo Pass.

The definitive conquest of Monte Altuzzo and its surrounding positions represented the decisive turning point for the breakthrough of the Gothic Line. German resistance on the mountain had by then been completely suppressed, and the Wehrmacht forces retreated in disorder toward the north, no longer capable of mounting an effective defense. Overall, during the entire operation, the 338th Infantry Regiment suffered 252 casualties in the 1st Battalion and an additional 38 in the 3rd Battalion, for a total of 290 casualties. This toll was heavy, but necessary, given the strategic value represented by the control of Monte Altuzzo for the offensive plans of the Fifth Army.

The day of September 18, 1944, thus marked the completion of an important tactical and strategic victory, which allowed the American II Corps to rapidly continue the advance through the Gothic Line and toward the Santerno River valley and the Po Valley.

Analysis of the Battle

The conquest of Monte Altuzzo represented an important moment in the campaign to break through the Gothic Line, within the broader framework of the American Fifth Army's operations aimed at breaching the central Apennine sector in the context of Operation "Olive." The American success at Giogo was primarily the result of the determination and courage shown by the soldiers of the 338th Infantry Regiment, particularly the 1st and 3rd Battalions, commanded respectively by Lieutenant Colonel Willis O. Jackson and Major Kelley, even though their command and tactical operations exhibited many critical issues.

Strengths

The first determining factor for success was the resilience of the American troops who, despite the severe terrain difficulties, the barbed wire barriers, the enemy's fortified positions, and the incessant German counterattacks, managed to maintain the offensive momentum for six consecutive days.
The effectiveness of American artillery support and air strikes proved decisive, succeeding in inflicting heavy losses and constantly preventing German reinforcements from consolidating their positions. Also fundamental was the American capacity to exploit the element of surprise and nighttime action, managing to infiltrate beyond the main enemy positions and thereby gaining precious ground.
It is also worth mentioning the readiness in managing certain critical situations: various soldiers and non-commissioned officers, such as Sergeant Lang, Sergeant Strosnider, Lieutenant Krasman, and Privates Lightner and Kubina, demonstrated courage and personal initiative, performing acts that contributed significantly to the achievement of intermediate and final tactical objectives.

Weaknesses

At the same time, the operation also revealed serious critical issues. The most evident was the insufficient coordination of units in the field, often due to problems in radio communications.
The erroneous identification of positions on the ground, which also led to cases of tragic Allied shellings on American soldiers.
Furthermore, the lack of timely logistical support forced advanced units to operate with limited ammunition and without the possibility of rapidly evacuating the wounded, significantly increasing the number of casualties and the severity of the conditions of the soldiers involved.
The difficulties encountered by Company B, which remained isolated for more than a day on the wrong hill under intense enemy fire, further highlighted the risks stemming from inadequate reconnaissance and limited knowledge of the terrain.

American Casualties

American casualties during the operation totaled 290, divided into 252 men from the 1st Battalion and 38 from the 3rd Battalion of the 338th Infantry Regiment.

Among these losses were numerous fallen, including soldiers William C. Leonard Jr., Angelo F. Crespi, Kenneth T. Moore, Anthony W. Houston, Kermit C. Fisher, George G. Keathley and many others, along with soldiers seriously wounded or missing in action.

Although these losses were high in absolute terms, they were considered justified in relation to the strategic and tactical importance of the captured position.

German casualties

On the German side, losses were extremely heavy. American artillery and aviation caused severe damage to enemy defensive positions, and testimonies from captured German soldiers indicated increasingly low morale, aggravated by casualties and a lack of supplies. Based on the information in the text, we can estimate German losses during the battle of Monte Altuzzo as follows:

Prisoners of war: circa 200 soldati tedeschi catturati dal 338° Reggimento Fanteria. Il totale riportato è di 212 prigionieri fino al 19 settembre.
Dead and wounded: Although the text does not report an exact figure for German fatalities, the losses were considerable, certainly over 300.
Deserters: It is reported that approximately forty soldiers of Lithuanian origin, integrated into German units as replacements, deserted.

Considering this information, it is possible to prudently estimate that total German losses (killed, wounded, missing, deserters, and prisoners) during the Battle of Monte Altuzzo were approximately between 400 and 500 units.

The losses inflicted on the German units – primarily the 12th Parachute Regiment and the Grenadier Lehr Brigade – definitively compromised their defensive capacity and led to the decision, made by the Wehrmacht command on the evening of September 17, to withdraw and abandon their positions on the Gothic Line, thus marking a fundamental turning point for the entire Italian campaign.

Lessons Learnt

The battle for Monte Altuzzo highlighted important lessons on a tactical and operational level.

The critical importance of an accurate terrain reconnaissance before the attack. The lack of familiarity with the complex terrain of the mountain led to navigation errors and advances toward incorrect positions, causing avoidable casualties and significant delays.
The necessity of improving communication and coordination between advanced units and command.since problems in radio communications and the localization of units on the field generated situations of isolation and friendly fire.
The logistics and the immediate management of resources represented a critical weak point: the inability to ensure a timely supply of ammunition and the rapid evacuation of the wounded greatly aggravated the losses. The experience showed how effective logistical and medical planning was fundamental to maintaining the fighting capacity of troops engaged on the front line.
The indispensable value ofindividual initiative and leadership in the field: in fact, in the most critical moments, it was the personal action and courage of individual soldiers and officers that allowed the American troops to overcome seemingly compromised situations.

In summary, the conquest of Monte Altuzzo highlighted for the advancing American army against the Germans entrenched in mountainous terrain the necessity of accurately integrating (1) a preliminary thorough reconnaissance of the ground, (2) communication between units, via radio and through messengers, (3) supplies of ammunition and water, (4) the individual initiative of motivated and courageous soldiers. Only in this way could military operations in the Apennines against German high-ground strongholds succeed and allow for a rapid advance toward the Po Valley.

Unfortunately, things went differently. The war in the Apennines – primarily due to high casualties and soldier morale, and adverse weather conditions that hindered logistics – would continue for another very long seven months.

The original complete text in ENGLISH by S.T. Mathews, with photos and maps in low resolution, is available in the official military history records.