The 2nd New Zealand Division from Greece to Tuscany

Honor to the “Kiwis”: Who They Were and Where They Fought

The summer of 1944 saw the arrival in Tuscany of the 2nd New Zealand Division, a Commonwealth combat unit commanded by General Sir Bernard Freyberg. A formation of great experience, it had already fought in Greece in 1941, then in Crete and North Africa. Freyberg’s “Kiwis” fought fiercely and with great honor also at Cassino, and—after a brief rest—were deployed in June 1944 along the Trasimene Line, where the Germans had established a temporary defensive position. They then took part, among other actions, in the Battle of Arezzo, which was liberated on 16 July. There, the 6th Infantry Brigade—and especially the 25th Battalion, engaged in driving German teams from Monte Lignano—played a decisive role in the capture of the city alongside the 6th South African Armoured Division, both part of the British Eighth Army commanded by Sir Oliver Leese.

In a highly complex theater of war, in that same month of July the 2nd New Zealand Division was transferred westward into the Chianti region via Monte San Savino and Siena—liberated by Juin’s French forces on 3 July. The headquarters was established in Castellina in Chianti, while infantry and armored units advanced toward Tavarnelle, San Donato, and San Casciano. During this phase of the campaign in Tuscany, a remarkable event occurred: the personal visit of King George VI of England to the New Zealand troops in Castellina in Chianti on 26 July 1944—a tangible sign of the attention that London devoted to this elite division.

The aim is to connect a series of lesser-known facts in order to reconstruct an overall picture that conveys the complexity of the Allied operations in Italy during the summer of 1944—a crucial phase of a long and harrowing war that saw men of many nationalities united in their determination to fight together against the suicidal and murderous madness of the Nazi-Fascist ideology.

Who are the “Kiwis”?

The 2nd New Zealand Division was formed in 1939–40 as the core of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF). It trained and reorganized at Maadi Camp, on the outskirts of Cairo, before fighting in Greece and Crete in 1941. Its contribution then extended to the Western Desert, moving through the campaigns of Crusader, Ruweisat, and El Alamein, helping to achieve the breakthrough that opened the road for the Allies toward Tripoli and Tunisia. The Division landed in Taranto on 3 October 1943, beginning combat operations on the Adriatic front along the Sangro River, where it played a key role in the hard-fought Battle of Orsogna, operating under conditions completely different from those of the desert. Later, between February and March 1944, it formed the core of the New Zealand Corps during the battles of Cassino. At full strength, the Division fielded about 16,000–17,000 men organized into two infantry brigades — the 5th Infantry Brigade, comprising the 21st, 23rd, and 28th (Māori) Battalions, and the 6th Infantry Brigade, comprising the 24th, 25th, and 26th Battalions — together with an armored formation, the 4th NZ Armoured Brigade, made up of the 18th, 19th, and 20th Armoured Regiments and the 22nd Motor Battalion, supported by divisional artillery, engineers, and anti-tank units. These details help to illustrate the scale of the New Zealanders’ effort and endurance throughout the long Italian Campaign.

1941–43: from the Balkans to the Desert

Between March and April 1941, the 2nd New Zealand Division was sent to Greece as part of the “W Force” (under General Wilson, alongside Australian and British troops). Its mission was to contain the German offensive along the Aliákmon Line, then withdraw through the passes of Mount Olympus, and finally hold the Thermopylae area to cover the evacuation. The attack of 6 April overwhelmed the defensive positions: the withdrawal was orderly but frantic, with New Zealand rearguards fighting to buy precious hours for the columns retreating toward the ports. On 25 April, the last units left the mainland. The cost was high: 291 killed, 387 seriously wounded, and 1,826 taken prisoner in the Greek campaign alone.

A few days later, the Division—scattered across islands and ports—regrouped in Crete, where on 20 May the Germans launched Operation “Mercury,” the massive airborne assault on Maleme, Chania, and Rethymno. The New Zealanders held strongpoints and airstrips, counterattacked, and blew up bridges. But when the Luftwaffe gained air superiority over the landing zones, enemy reinforcements poured in, and the island became indefensible. The evacuation through Sfakia at the end of May was harsh and incomplete: 671 New Zealanders were killed, and more than 2,000 taken prisoner. Crete ended in tragedy, but it also left behind emblematic figures (Upham, Hulme) and a lasting bond with the local population.

In the Western Desert of North Africa, the New Zealanders found themselves in a war of movement. Between Libya and Egypt, the Division fought a “fluid” campaign made up of night thrusts, flanking maneuvers, and daytime counterattacks with tanks and armored cars. Operation “Crusader” in November 1941 saw the New Zealanders fighting hard at Sidi Rezegh/Point 175: the 25th Battalion took part in some of the bloodiest actions, suffering over 100 killed in a single day (23 November), 150 wounded, and 100 captured. It was the highest toll paid by any New Zealand battalion in a single engagement during the entire war. The operation as a whole succeeded, reopening the corridor to Tobruk, but the cost in infantry units was extremely high.

In the summer of 1942, at Ruweisat Ridge (First Battle of El Alamein), the Division captured the ridge in a night offensive. But at dawn the tanks were missing: mines and sand had delayed their deployment, the artillery struggled to take position, and the German panzers counterattacked. The result was devastating—heavy losses and entire units overrun or forced to surrender. The lesson was clear: without close cooperation between infantry, armor, and artillery, it was impossible to hold positions against German mobility.

At El Alamein, the New Zealanders faced a turning point. In early November 1942, when Montgomery renewed the offensive, the 2nd New Zealand Division played a leading role in the final phase of Operation “Supercharge.” Reinforced by British brigades, the Division led the night attack to open corridors through the minefields and break the German anti-tank screen. Behind them, the 9th Armoured Brigade suffered heavy losses while breaking through the German 88s and Pak guns, allowing the main British armored forces to surge forward. It was the operational breakthrough. During the enemy’s retreat westward, the New Zealand contribution was crucial. The long pursuit across North Africa ended in Tunisia: in late March 1943, the New Zealanders played a key role at the Tebaga Gap with the “left hook” maneuver of the New Zealand Corps. In May, Tunis fell, and the Axis forces in Africa surrendered to the Allies. It was the moment for a major reorganization. Africa had taught its lessons—but the terrain in Italy would prove very different, and the challenges no less significant.

The Formation of the 4th NZ Armoured Brigade and the Combined Doctrine

The former 4th Infantry Brigade was converted on 2 October 1942 into the 4th New Zealand Armoured Brigade with the addition of three tank regiments—the 18th, 19th, and 20th Armoured equipped with Shermans, plus Stuarts for reconnaissance, and the 22nd (Motor) Battalion for mechanized infantry. The equipment changed, and so did the doctrine. The infantry battalions of the 5th and 6th Brigades increasingly operated in battle groups alongside armored squadrons, engineer sections, anti-tank guns, and heavy mortars. This combined-arms doctrine aimed to reach the objective together, hold it at dawn, and repel the counterattack. It would become the distinctive “style” of the New Zealand Division in Italy: rivers and towns were reached through the synchronized advance of infantry, tanks, and artillery.

 

November–December 1943: at Orsogna on the Adriatic Front

Landing at Taranto on 3 October 1943, the 2nd New Zealand Division advanced up the Adriatic coast as part of the British Eighth Army. This sector—the “Adriatic front”—formed the eastern half of the Allied deployment in Italy, stretching along the coastal plain and the first Apennine ridges. In November 1943, the Eighth Army aimed to break through the German Winter Line along the Sangro River in order to open the Via Valeria toward the Pescara–Rome axis. The operation was carried out by General Allfrey’s V Corps, with the 78th Infantry Division and the 8th Indian Division in the lead. The 2nd New Zealand Division advanced further inland, on the corps’ right flank, toward Orsogna, to protect the main axis and threaten the German strongpoints on the heights. After delays caused by heavy rain and flooding, the crossing of the Sangro began on 27 November: bridges destroyed by the enemy, fords under fire, and roads turned impassable by mud. The New Zealanders established bridgeheads and pushed on toward the Guardiagrele–Orsogna ridge, while bad weather slowed the construction of bridges needed to bring tanks and supplies up to the front.

At Orsogna, a hilltop town defended by steep ridges, a series of difficult attacks took place between 7 and 24 December on hilly terrain cut by gullies and ravines—ground that favored the defenders. On 7 December, during Operation “Torso,” the New Zealand Division launched two brigades toward the town: the infantry reached the outskirts, but the advance of the 4th NZ Armoured Brigade was hindered by mines, craters, and narrow approaches. The German formations—the 26th Panzer Division and elements of the 1st Fallschirmjäger Division—skillfully employed minefields, anti-tank weapons, and local counterattacks, making consolidation extremely difficult. On 15 December, a renewed assault gained only a slight advance at the cost of heavy losses in men and equipment. By the end of the month, snow and mud paralyzed the roads, and the Adriatic offensive was suspended until conditions improved. Why did Montgomery’s offensive on the Adriatic sector come to a halt? Because of the convergence of three factors: (1) Weather and terrain — flooded rivers, narrow ridges, and gullies that channeled enemy fire; (2) Reduced armored mobility — tanks could move only along ridge roads, easily mined and covered by anti-tank fire; (3) The effectiveness of the German elastic defense — systematic withdrawals and counterattacks that preserved local initiative. In the background loomed another tragedy: Ortona, the “little Stalingrad,” where the Adriatic port was taken by the Canadians at a terrible cost. But that is another story.

February–March 1944: Cassino and the New Zealand Corps

In February 1944, the Division was transferred from the Adriatic to the Tyrrhenian front, in the Cassino sector, to assist in breaking through the Gustav Line under the command of the U.S. Fifth Army. For this purpose, a special formation was created — the New Zealand Corps — composed of the 2nd New Zealand Division and the 4th Indian Division, supported by strong artillery and auxiliary units. On 15 February, after the bombing of the abbey, the initial assault — which included the 28th Māori Battalion advancing toward the railway station and its river crossings — was shattered by crossfire and the extreme difficulty of crossing the Rapido River.

During the Third Battle of Cassino (15–23 March 1944), the plan assigned the 6th NZ Infantry Brigade the task of entering and holding the town center, while the 4th Indian Division advanced up the slopes toward Hangman’s Hill. The tanks of the 19th Armoured Regiment struggled to move forward: rubble, craters, demolition charges, and minefields blocked the routes, while engineer bulldozers came under constant fire. Armored support for the infantry arrived only intermittently, often too late. The paratroopers of the 1st Fallschirmjäger Division turned the ruined blocks into defensive strongpoints. The New Zealanders advanced house by house — through the Castle Hill, the botanical gardens, and the railway station — but every breach was sealed again within hours. On 23 March the attacks were halted; on 26 March the New Zealand Corps was disbanded, and the New Zealand and Indian divisions were withdrawn to regroup. For the 2nd NZ Division the toll was severe: battalions worn out and heavy losses in men and equipment. Why did Cassino not fall? Several factors worked in favor of the Germans: the shattered urban terrain made close infantry–tank cooperation impossible; the defensive skill of the 1st Fallschirmjäger Division was decisive; rain and mud along the Rapido hampered bridging and crossings; the Allies struggled to synchronize the mountain assaults with the fighting in the town, while communications remained fragile.

After Cassino, Avezzano: April 1944

After the dissolution of the New Zealand Corps, the 2nd NZ Division returned to the Eighth Army, positioned on the right flank of the Allied line — the north-eastern Apennine sector relative to the main advance toward Rome. Recovering from the exhaustion of Cassino, the division was employed as a “mobile reserve,” a cohesive and maneuverable force to be rapidly deployed wherever needed: to close a gap, protect a flank, or exploit a breakthrough. In practice, between Abruzzo and Lazio, the New Zealanders covered the inner, Apennine side of the Allied formation. Meanwhile, the Division reorganized in the Avezzano area, focusing on training, replacements, vehicle maintenance, and rebuilding its command structure after the grueling battles of Orsogna and Cassino. By the end of the month, the New Zealand Division was once again ready to resume the offensive.

May–June 1944: After Rome, the Redeployment

With the fall of Rome on 4 June 1944, the Italian campaign changed both pace and shape. The German army withdrew along a series of successive defensive lines — Trasimene/“Frieda” (June), Arezzo and then the Arno (July) — designed to slow the Allied pursuit and gain precious weeks to complete the Gothic Line (“Green Line”) in the Apennines. Within this framework, the Eighth Army set its corps in motion along multiple axes, assigning the X Corps — comprising the 2nd New Zealand Division and the 8th and 10th Indian Divisions — to protect the advance on its right flank, while other formations pressed forward in depth. It was an elastic deployment: some units fought against German delaying positions, others provided cover, and others still remained ready to move in when a breach opened. On 10 June, elements of the 2nd New Zealand Division entered Avezzano, and shortly afterward the division was placed in army reserve for a period of rest, reinforcement, and training in preparation for its next engagement against the Trasimene Line and later at Arezzo. What did “mobile reserve” mean in practice? For a mixed infantry–armoured division like the New Zealanders, it meant remaining concentrated and well supplied behind the front, with sufficient artillery, transport, and tanks to move rapidly along difficult roads and intervene wherever needed: to close a gap, support another unit’s attack, or exploit a breakthrough. In the days at Avezzano — the natural gateway between the Marsica plain and the Apennine ridge — this translated into re-equipment after Cassino, integration of reinforcements, night-march training, engineering work, and bridge-crossing exercises on rivers and temporary structures. After months of urban combat, the New Zealanders were returning to open country — as it was said, moving “from the ruins of Cassino to the promise of the Arno.” A signalman, after a jeep run to Avezzano, wrote: “Avezzano is a very modern city, surrounded by thousands of acres of farmland... set in a vast flat basin.” Operating once again in open terrain and along usable roads was a breath of fresh air for a unit long accustomed to fighting in the open.

July 1944: From the Trasimene Line to the Capture of Arezzo

With the mid-July operations order, the 2nd New Zealand Division was assigned to the XIII Corps for the offensive against the Trasimene/“Frieda” Line, known as the “Albert Line” in its Tyrrhenian sector. The task given to the Kiwis was to cover the Corps’ right flank during the push toward Arezzo. In practical terms, this meant maintaining contact along the eastern edge of the Val di Chiana, at the foot of the Tuscan–Emilian Apennines, guarding against infiltrations or counterattacks that might descend from the mountain ridges onto the main axis of advance toward the Arno and the Gothic Line. To open the “gateway” to Arezzo, it was necessary to dislodge the two anchors of the German defensive system southeast of the city. The 6th NZ Infantry Brigade was assigned to clear the ridge line of Camurcina–Lignano at the approaches to Arezzo, dividing responsibilities by sector: the 24th Battalion advanced on Monte Camurcina, the 25th Battalion targeted Monte Lignano, while the 26th Battalion reinforced and relieved as needed. For example, taking over from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders south of Monte Cavadenti and from the King’s Royal Rifle Corps, the New Zealanders closed the gaps that had opened between units. At dawn on 15 July, under artillery cover, the 25th Battalion attacked along the Camurcina–Lignano ridge, seized the crest of Monte Lignano, and held it despite retaliatory fire. The toll was 17 killed and 48 wounded, four of whom later died. Meanwhile, the 24th Battalion pressed forward and secured Camurcina, while the 26th Battalion closed the gaps along the penetration line. The fighting remained fierce around Hill 575, where the Germans were well entrenched, and in the area of the Convent of Sargiano near the L’Olmo Pass, where the road connecting to the Arezzo basin ran. The following day, 16 July 1944, Arezzo was captured by the Eighth Army: the 6th South African Armoured Division entered the city with the decisive support of the 2nd New Zealand Division. The sector was then stabilized through the cooperation of British armored forces operating in the area, while the Indian divisions advanced toward Arezzo from the Valtiberina, relieving the New Zealand and South African units, which moved on toward the Chianti region.

Late July: the Kiwis in place of the French

In the Tuscan sector, the Allied balance of forces shifted rapidly, both in response to progress on the ground and as a result of broader strategic decisions. The French Expeditionary Corps in Italy (*Corps Expéditionnaire Français en Italie*, or CEF), commanded by General Alphonse Juin, was an army-sized formation composed mainly of *Armée d’Afrique* troops—the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division, the 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division, and the 4th Moroccan Mountain Division, with Moroccan *goumiers* specialized in mountain warfare. After spearheading the breakthrough of the Gustav Line and contributing to the liberation of Siena on 3 July 1944, the French forces were designated for a new strategic mission: the invasion of southern France. The operation, decided in July and launched on 15 August under the name “Dragoon” (originally “Anvil”), had one main objective—to open the major ports of Toulon and Marseille to provide logistical support to the armies that had landed in Normandy and to accelerate pressure on the Western Front. This decision led to the transfer of the bulk of the French forces from Italy to General de Lattre’s *1ère Armée* for the landing in Provence and the advance up the Rhône Valley.

The operational “gap” left by the French withdrawal from Tuscany was filled by British and Commonwealth units assigned to the XIII Corps: the 6th South African Armoured Division from the Trasimene area to Arezzo, the 4th British Infantry Division, and the 6th British Armoured Division, supported on the flanks by the 8th Indian Division. Within this same formation, the 2nd New Zealand Division was tasked with advancing into the Chianti region against the “Paula” Line, south of Florence. The corps-level offensive, planned for the end of July, reached the “Paula” Line on 28 July, with the New Zealanders assigned the main assault for the breakthrough toward the city.

After contributing decisively to the capture of Arezzo, in the second half of July 1944 the New Zealanders reorganized around their base at Castellina in Chianti. The various New Zealand brigades were deployed along the ridges descending toward the Val di Pesa, projecting their advance along the Via Cassia and the heights overlooking Tavarnelle, San Donato, and San Casciano. This sector covered the approaches to Florence from the southwest, where the 2nd New Zealand Division led its advance. In particular, the 5th Brigade opened the road toward San Casciano, while the 6th Brigade stood ready to exploit the breakthrough along the Pesa and to maintain lateral contact with the South Africans and other British units.

Approach to the Gates of Florence: Terrain, Resistance, Method

From 17 to 24 July, the Kiwis advanced from the Valdichiana to the Val di Pesa through the Chianti region—a rugged, challenging landscape of ridges, winding roads, woods, and hilltop villages. Their tactic was that of a “pincer” along parallel ridgelines: the 4th Armoured Brigade advanced where possible and, where it could not, provided covering fire and bombardment; meanwhile, the infantry and engineers opened fords and corridors through the rubble and mines left behind in the villages by the retreating enemy. In this area, since mid-June, the Chianti partisan groups had intensified their assaults and acts of sabotage against telephone lines, garrisons, and secondary roads.

On 23 and 24 July, the New Zealand vanguards descended toward the Pesa stream, whose crossings were under enemy fire. The infantry and motorized units of the 5th and 6th Brigades took turns advancing through Sambuca and Fabbrica, where German rearguards attempted local counterattacks. This signaled that the defense was stiffening along the next belt—the Olga/Paula Line—designed to slow access to the final hills and ridges before the Arno. Contemporary Allied sources describe a pattern of continuous movement, brief engagements, harassing fire, and sudden explosions from mined houses. For this phase, reference should be made to the important pages written by Claudio Biscarini on the fighting south of Florence and on the battle of San Michele a Torri, which opened the route toward Scandicci and Florence.

26 July 1944: King George VI among the Kiwis

The presence of the New Zealanders in the Chianti region is also documented by the official photographs of King George VI’s personal visit to the Kiwi troops on 26 July 1944. In those days, across the Tuscan front, British and Commonwealth units were taking over from the French in the exhausting advance northward toward the Arno Line and Florence. The King wished to see for himself the men holding that crucial sector. He reached the Division as it advanced toward Florence, arriving in Castellina in Chianti via Siena from Monte San Savino. The photographs by George Kaye—preserved at the Alexander Turnbull Library and on DigitalNZ—capture the key moments: the arrival of the car and entourage, the greeting with General Freyberg, the inspection of the guard of honor, and a brief stop beside operational maps spread over the bonnet of a field vehicle. Soldiers remembered the visit as swift, marked by handshakes and a few measured words, yet enough to lift the morale of men who had been fighting continuously for months. The King’s presence—and, soon after, Winston Churchill’s documented appearance in the Greve area—signaled how decisive London considered the work of the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Chianti wedge, on the eve of the assault against the “Paula” Line to take Florence.

From the Trasimene Line to Arezzo, and then along the Chianti ridges to the Val di Pesa, the 2nd New Zealand Division brought to Tuscany the experience it had gained in Greece, Crete, and North Africa—adapting it to difficult terrain and to an enemy determined to buy time for the Gothic Line. The handover from the French to the British and Commonwealth forces, the establishment of headquarters at Castellina, and the King’s visit are pieces of an operational story marked by battles whose official reports still await to be written in full detail. Among the British formations, it was the New Zealanders in particular who drove the Allied front forward toward Florence in the final days of July 1944. The continuation of this story—the clash along the “Paula” Line and the bloody battle of San Michele a Torri, where the New Zealanders distinguished themselves with determination and honor—leads into the pages reconstructed by Claudio Biscarini, to whom we refer for the account of those final, grueling days before the entry into the Florentine area.