by Andrea Gatti
This document is an original monograph of the U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning (USA), drafted as a didactic tool for the training of officers in battalion tactics in mountainous terrain. analyzes the operation of the 2nd Battalion of the 338th Infantry Regiment (85th Infantry Division “Custer”) for the capture of Monte delle Formiche: a main example of the difficulties encountered on the Gothic Line, which highlights the importance of coordination between infantry, tanks and artillery and the leadership of small units under extreme conditions. importantly, the operation was commanded and later taught by Captain Orville Emile Bloch, who had been awarded the Medal of Honor for an action conducted the previous month on Monte Coloreta, the highest U.S. decoration for valor in combat.
The Taking of Monte delle Formiche
INFANTRY SCHOOL – GENERAL SECTION – MILITARY HISTORY COMMITTEE
FORT BENNING, GEORGIA- ADVANCED OFFICERS COURSE 1946–1947
The Operations of the 2nd Battalion, 338th Infantry (85th U.S. Infantry Division)
inthe Capture of Monte delle Formiche, Italy 10–13 October 1944
Northern Apennines Campaign / Personal Experience of a Rifle Platoon Commander
-
Captain Orville Emile Bloch, Medal of Honour
Type of Operation: BATTALION IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
- Commander: Captain Orville E. Bloch, Infantry, Medal of Honour
Introduction
This monograph relates the action of the 2nd Battalion, 338th Infantry Regiment, 85th U.S. Infantry Division, in the capture of Monte delle Formiche, 10–13 October 1944, during the Northern Apennines Campaign in Italy. After the fall of Rome, the Fifth Army pushed north against a strong, well-organized and determined enemy rear-guard action. The general consensus among all combatants was that the next major enemy resistance would take place somewhere along the Northern Apennines barrier stretching from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Adriatic north of Florence. This soon became known throughout the world as the German Gothic Line. From the moment the Allies first landed in Italy, the Germans had developed this natural defensive position, accelerating the pace of its construction after the fall of Rome. The Germans had reinforced this position with a formidable chain of pillboxes and rock-cut bunkers, carefully sited, extensive barbed-wire entanglements, minefields, and anti-tank obstacles, all integrated into the rugged, mountainous terrain rising to elevations of 3,000 to 4,000 feet [900–1,200 meters] above sea level. The mission of the Fifth and Eighth Armies was to break through the Gothic Line, exploit this breakthrough, and debouch into the plains of the Po Valley. At dawn on 10 September, after a long pause to regroup and prepare an offensive, the Fifth Army launched its thrust to pierce the much-vaunted line. The U.S. II Corps bore the brunt of the assault, striking the line with three divisions along the axis of the Florence–Bologna highway. This road was known as Highway 65. The battle for the Gothic Line, like the Gustav Line Campaign in southern Italy the previous winter, resolved itself into a series of bitterly fought actions for the dominant mountainous features that formed the key points of the enemy defense. Beyond the Gothic Line, the Germans had forty miles of mountainous terrain to defend before the Allies could deploy their power on ground more suitable for offensive warfare. Numerous transverse compartments offered the enemy excellent defensive positions, and many of them were as formidable as the initial line itself.
The Breakthrough (of the Gothic Line)
On 18 September, the Gothic Line was breached. This event occurred only after some of the severest fighting ever encountered in Italy had taken place. As the days passed and the Apennines began to seem endless, it appeared that the entire mountain chain to the north might be called the Gothic Line. Whatever the name, it blocked the way to the Po Valley, and it was toward that region that the Allies were now directing their powerful offensive forces. However, in pleasing contrast to the first week of fighting, the advance was now progressing at what seemed a remarkable rate, with as much as two miles covered in a day. Initially the enemy was somewhat disorganized, but soon began to make use of every advantage offered by the terrain. Enemy reinforcements moved constantly. The 85th Division was opposed by the German 4th Parachute Division during the first ten days of fighting. Following this period, elements of the 362nd Division “Greiner,” various units of the 715th Infantry Division, and elements of the Lehr Brigade made their appearance. Many mountain masses were about to enter the line of advance of the 85th Division. Some of these were Monte Altuzzo, Coloreta, Canda, Bibele, Monte delle Formiche, Monterenzio, Fano, Castelvecchio, Castellaro, and many others.
The Objective
The battle area
The specific mountain mass about which I write is Monte delle Formiche. This mountain was part of one of the German secondary defensive lines and was characterized by being particularly formidable because of the steep cliffs that fell away on all sides except the north. It was doubly important for the enemy to hold Monte delle Formiche since it commanded Highway 65 in the sector of the Division on the left, as well as the Idice Valley road. In addition, it afforded complete observation over the entire area for a distance of six miles to the south. The 2nd Battalion of the 338th Infantry Regiment, 85th Division, was assigned the task of wresting this critical terrain feature from enemy hands. This Battalion, being in reserve at that time, followed closely behind the 3rd Battalion of the same Regiment, which was fighting tenaciously forward to establish a specific Line of Departure through which the 2nd Battalion was to pass in its attack. Below Monte delle Formiche, the terrain was very hilly and there was little opportunity for cover and concealment for the two battalions as they moved forward from one hill to another. In view of this, and of the fact that the enemy had excellent observation, the progress of the 3rd Battalion was extremely difficult. In addition, the enemy was not using delaying tactics alone, but stubbornly resisted every foot of advance with machine-gun fire, sniper fire, small arms, and mortar and artillery barrages. Every hill, ridgeline, and building was used by the enemy as a strongpoint. No ground was yielded to the attacker without contest. During the night of 10 October, the 3rd Battalion had accomplished its assigned mission of establishing a Line of Departure for the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion was to remain in its present position and be prepared for operations to the right of Monte delle Formiche. Combat patrols were sent out during the night and contact was established with the enemy along the entire regimental front. However, the patrols were heavily engaged and driven back toward our lines by intense machine-gun and mortar fire. The enemy appeared extremely sensitive and responded promptly to every move made by the forward companies.
Enemy Fortifications and Terrain
The morphological difficulty of the terrain
Directly in front of the cliffs of Monte delle Formiche, the terrain was exceptionally smooth, sloping gently southward for approximately 1,000 yards, and as bare as the fairway of a golf course. Everyone in the 2nd Battalion felt heavy-hearted, for the task appeared impossible. The summit of the mountain rose to approximately 2,040 feet above sea level. The Germans had fortified the forward slopes with skillfully camouflaged weapon positions, all carefully sited to provide excellent fields of fire along the slopes. On the summit of the mountain, heavy machine guns, as well as weapons of smaller caliber, were emplaced to cover the forward area with plunging fire. The valley below was dotted with “Schuh” mines and picket minefields covering the most logical avenues of approach. Immediately below the steep cliffs, and about three-quarters of the way up the mountain, lay the small village of Maceratoia. To the rear left on the ridge lay the village of Ca’ del Monte. At the base of the cliffs below Ca’ del Monte there were numerous caves. These caves afforded the enemy excellent firing positions covering the approaches to the buildings of Ca’ del Monte. The ridge of Ca’ del Monte sloped down toward the northwest, falling gradually into the valley below.
Plan of Attack
The initial plan of the 2nd Battalion was to attack in a column of companies (a formation often used in the Italian Campaign), with the first objective being the village of Ca’ del Monte; from there to push north with two companies abreast, cutting behind the mountain. The 1st Battalion was to push up the Idice Valley to the right of the objective. The combined action of the two battalions was to envelop the mountain ridge and eventually clear it of the enemy from the north. Because of the bare terrain in front of the cliffs of Monte delle Formiche, there was no cover for maneuver. This therefore appeared to be the only logical plan of attack. Easy Company was to lead, followed by George Company, with Fox Company in reserve. In support of this contemplated attack, tanks were moved forward toward the ridge along the Line of Departure, taking hull defilade positions and were to fire directly into the buildings of Maceratoia and Ca’ del Monte. Divisional Artillery was to fire Time-on-Target missions on the same two villages, the 4.2-inch Chemical Mortars were to cover the rear areas of the mountain, and the Cannon Company was to cover the ridge, shifting their fire as directed. The 81-mm mortars of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were to fire a covering smoke screen, if necessary, for the attacking forces. All fires mentioned were to be ready to fire on call. Because the enemy dominated the terrain, a ground reconnaissance was impossible; therefore, on 9 October, a reconnaissance was conducted using binoculars and maps. It was decided to attack Maceratoia from the left flank. A small drainage ditch was observed running southwest of Maceratoia toward the valley below, a distance of approximately 1,000 yards, which offered the only cover, meager as it was, in the entire area. At 05:50, 10 October, Item Company succeeded in taking La Casona on the extreme left flank of the Regiment. Two platoons of Easy Company moved forward to La Casona to relieve Item Company. The attack on Ca’ del Monte was to be launched from this point at 06:00 hours. Final plans were formulated as follows: the 1st Platoon of Easy Company was to lead the attack, with the mission of taking Maceratoia. The 2nd and 3rd Platoons were to follow, pass through the 1st Platoon at Maceratoia, and attack Ca’ del Monte.
The Attack
Before dawn, the 1st Platoon, with a strength of 18 men, moved out from La Casona, crossed the open ground under cover of darkness, and reached the aforementioned drainage ditch. The formation assumed in the ditch was a column of squads with each man directly behind the other on his stomach. The desired element of surprise compelled all men to crawl and advance on hands and knees toward the objective, Maceratoia. By SCR-556 radio communication, the Company Commander was contacted and notified of the platoon’s position. As the platoon advanced, this contact was maintained. At 08:00, the supporting weapons began to place their devastating fires on the assigned target areas. Daylight was slow in coming because of a heavy fog that obscured the area from enemy observation. It did not take long for the enemy to sense the impending attack, although their observation was greatly reduced. They began to cover the forward slopes of the mountain with concentrations of mortar and artillery fire, most of which was ineffective as it missed the ditch by a considerable distance. Progress was extremely difficult for the 1st Platoon because the ditch was exceedingly muddy and varied from only 2 to 4 feet in width and depth. To the men, the shallow, muddy ditch seemed to extend for miles rather than only 1,000 yards. The 1st Platoon moved as rapidly as possible, urged on by the prevailing thought of reaching the objective before the fog lifted. As they neared Maceratoia, all attempts to contact the 3rd Platoon by radio failed. In spite of this, the 1st Platoon continued to advance. By 08:30, the platoon was in position to assault the objective. Bayonets were fixed and final instructions given. The platoon was then divided into three squads of six men each. Each squad was assigned a portion of the small group of buildings at Maceratoia and was to enter from the west and south. The platoon commander radioed the Company Commander and requested that artillery and tank fire be shifted from Maceratoia to Ca’ del Monte and to the church on the summit of the mountain. All fires were shifted as requested, and without a moment’s hesitation the assault began, each squad dashing toward its assigned sector, firing rifles as they rapidly closed on the objective. Maceratoia was ours. The attack had been successful, and one thing had made it so: the maximum use of supporting artillery fire. The 1st Platoon had followed it very closely and, as the fire lifted, assaulted the enemy positions before the enemy could raise their heads to fire their weapons—complete surprise had been achieved. At Maceratoia the 1st Platoon captured one artillery prime mover, one antitank gun, four machine guns, and 19 prisoners. The prisoners were disarmed, searched, and some were interrogated. They were then assembled in a large room, the door closed behind them and securely blocked. The prisoners were left there since no men could be spared to guard them and it was felt that the risk to our men in sending them to the rear was too great, as the protective fog had lifted. Immediately the platoon took positions in and around the buildings of the town; the following message was sent to the Company Commander: “Objective taken, no casualties, have 19 prisoners.” The Company Commander, Lieutenant William G. Coblin of Frankfort, Kentucky, a bold and aggressive officer, replied that he was leaving La Casona en route to the objective and that he wanted the 1st Platoon to continue on toward Ca’ del Monte. After receiving this order, radio contact with anyone was lost by the 1st Platoon. Little activity took place during the next 20 minutes except for light enemy mortar fire falling around the area to our rear and in the vicinity of La Casona. Our supporting fires continued to fall on the crest of Monte delle Formiche around the church and to the left of Ca’ del Monte. Plans for the attack on Ca’ del Monte were initiated by the 1st Platoon commander. Some of the prisoners, when interrogated, revealed that the ridge of Ca’ del Monte was held by a reinforced infantry company. It was decided that Maceratoia could not be left undefended since the 19 prisoners were still there and the 2nd Platoon of Easy Company had not yet arrived. Ten men of the platoon were to remain at Maceratoia; the remaining eight, plus the platoon commander, were to advance toward Ca’ del Monte. The route of advance was along a trail from Maceratoia to Ca’ del Monte. The patrol moved slowly, kept close to the sides of the cliffs, and took advantage of the limited cover and concealment that existed. Ca’ del Monte appeared deserted. No activity was seen or heard. Hopes began to rise that the town was unoccupied because of the heavy bombardment it had received. When the group reached a point within 50 yards of the first building, they split into two separate groups, one consisting of four men and the other of five. The group of five men dashed into building no. 1; the other group ran forward and took positions on the west side of building no. 2. The platoon commander took a position from which he could control both groups. Nothing happened—everything was quiet. It soon became evident that the enemy was unaware that an attacking force was in his immediate area and, furthermore, did not know that Maceratoia was no longer occupied by his troops. The men who had taken building no. 1 captured eight Germans, including a lieutenant. One man from the group hurried the prisoners back toward the holding cell at Maceratoia. No sooner had he departed than all hell broke loose at Ca’ del Monte. The enemy had finally realized the presence of our troops and immediately began to attack the small group from three directions: both flanks and the front. Machine-gun fire seemed to come from everywhere as the enemy closed in to capture the intruders. Defensive positions were taken and fire was returned, but the force was overwhelming. Little could be done to stop them. The four men in building no. 1 were completely pinned down by machine-gun fire; there was no exit for them. They continued to return fire from doors and windows until the enemy forced them to surrender. One of the men, Private First Class (Pfc) Richard J. Kerrigan of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was hit through the right shoulder. He charged out of the house yelling, throwing his rifle, helmet, and cartridge belt to the ground, then made a mad dash for Maceratoia. Apparently the enemy was paralyzed by this action, as not a shot was fired at the fleeing wounded soldier. The platoon commander, realizing that it was impossible to take Ca’ del Monte with the number of men available, called his men to attempt a breakout toward Maceratoia. Four men succeeded in returning. Artillery and mortar fire now began to fall on the entire forward slope of the mountain. Maceratoia was mortared and machine-gunned from positions on the summit of the mountain and from the left flank. The 2nd Platoon had followed the drainage ditch and had some cover; however, the 3rd Platoon was caught in the open, completely exposed, and desperately attempted to dig in wherever they encountered hard ground. Every move they made could be clearly observed from Maceratoia, as well as by the enemy at Ca’ del Monte. New orders were received by the 1st Platoon to hold Maceratoia at all costs and that the remainder of Easy Company and George Company would close on the area that night under cover of darkness. There was no alternative for the 1st Platoon; they had to hold Maceratoia since withdrawal was impossible. As the bombardment continued, the prisoners became restless. One of our wounded men stood guard at the blocked door while the remaining 14 men of the platoon took up defensive positions inside the buildings of the town. Although the buildings were badly damaged, they provided ample protection from enemy fire. During the remaining hours of daylight, the platoon was occupied in locating enemy weapon positions. At this time they discovered the caves on the left flank and below Ca’ del Monte. This information was sent back and direct tank fire was brought to bear on them. Immediately after darkness, all of Easy and George Companies closed on Maceratoia, and the best possible means of defense was established. At 22:00 that night, the 2nd and 3rd Platoons of Easy Company again attacked Ca’ del Monte. A hard firefight developed as the enemy stubbornly defended his positions, and little progress was made. The platoons became disorganized and once again the attack failed. Every man was completely exhausted from the fighting, but Easy Company again closed on the area around Maceratoia to establish a semi-perimeter defense. The two companies dug in well around the town. Easy Company had two platoons dug in forward and to the left of Maceratoia, with the support platoon in position on the left rear of the two forward platoons. George Company occupied the buildings and had one platoon dug in to the right of the town. Fox Company was in reserve, taking positions in the ravine south of Maceratoia. That night a new plan was made to attack over the mountain before dawn, 11 October, with the two leading companies abreast. Fox Company was to move up and occupy Maceratoia upon the departure of Easy and George Companies. Easy Company was given the mission of taking Ca’ del Monte, clearing the enemy from the Ca’ del Monte ridge, and holding until further orders. George Company was to take the church, the cemetery, the mountain crest, and continue the attack. Fox Company was to pass through Easy Company to the right of Ca’ del Monte and push forward with George Company on the right. The 1st Battalion was to attack simultaneously with the 2nd Battalion. It was to push to the right of Monte delle Formiche, clearing the enemy from the right slopes of the mountain and the valley below. Complete plans were made by all companies. Ammunition and ration resupply was accomplished during the night. Patrols were sent out to keep the enemy occupied above Maceratoia.
Enemy Counterattacks
That night at 03:30, 11 October, both Easy and George Companies received one of the heaviest counterattacks ever directed against the Battalion. It was then evident that the Germans considered Monte delle Formiche one of the key points of their defense. A frantic night battle began and continued until dawn. The enemy had moved many automatic weapons forward and massed them on the crest of the mountain above Maceratoia. Enemy troops moved out from Ca’ del Monte and struck Easy Company frontally, the element of surprise now favoring the enemy. The enemy move was so rapid that there was little time for warning of the impending counterattack. Easy Company’s outpost line was driven back. Enemy automatic weapons above Maceratoia opened fire, pouring a hail of lead into the village below. The prime mover that had been captured and parked alongside the buildings at Maceratoia was set on fire by an enemy incendiary grenade. The burning vehicle illuminated the entire town, making it doubly difficult for the defenders—them being in the light while the enemy lay around and above the town in darkness. Grenades seemed to come from every direction. Rifle grenades were fired through windows and doors and exploded inside the buildings. The enemy pressed the attack with full fury and a deadly determination to retake Maceratoia. Easy Company on the left was forced to give ground. The right portion of its line was driven back toward the first building in its sector. As the enemy moved to within 40 yards of this building, they began blowing holes in the walls with Panzerfausts—the German equivalent of our bazooka. Every door and window in the village poured fire in the direction of the attack as rapidly as the men could reload their weapons. To the weary soldiers it seemed that the prime mover would never cease burning. Two hours of exhausting combat against morale-shattering odds passed before the attack was finally repulsed. The Germans withdrew, but continued to harass the town from their commanding position.
The final assault
The following morning, 11 October, the Battalion attacked as previously planned, preceded by the best coordinated artillery, tank, and mortar barrages ever witnessed. Easy Company, following the tank fire exceptionally closely, was able to advance all the way to the cliffs of Ca’ del Monte. With bazooka fire, it fought its way through the town and cleared the enemy from the mountain ridge extending to the east. One platoon of George Company scaled the steep cliffs, reached the mountain crest, and occupied the enemy positions in the cemetery. Another platoon immediately joined the first and pushed on to clear the enemy in the vicinity of the church. After this foothold was gained, the two platoons pressed forward against strong enemy resistance. The support platoon of George Company moved into and around the church. Fox Company, still in reserve, moved into Maceratoia. The enemy committed a serious error which proved highly advantageous to us—the attacker. He left his positions along the mountain crest thinly held by scattered troops, while the main body pulled back from the crest to obtain greater protection from the artillery fire that was falling along his forward positions. (This incident definitely proves the weakness of a reverse-slope defense.) As a result, George Company was able to reach the summit of Monte delle Formiche. Following the success of George Company, the enemy frantically counterattacked in an effort to regain his lost position. Enemy self-propelled weapons and artillery began to bombard the George Company area. The church collapsed, causing many casualties in the support platoon, including the company commander. Through all this, George Company tenaciously held its gains, inflicting heavy losses on the counterattacking enemy. The Germans continued to counterattack. Fox Company was ordered to move between Easy and George Companies. Higher headquarters became concerned. They did not wish to lose Monte delle Formiche to German counterattacks; therefore, Item and Love Companies of the 3rd Battalion were attached to reconstitute a reserve and provide additional power to the 2nd Battalion, which had all companies committed. The 3rd Battalion of the 339th Infantry was also attached to the 338th Infantry at 15:00, 11 October, to be used only on Division order. The attack continued with Fox and George Companies pushing steadily forward despite bitter enemy resistance. This advance persisted until darkness once again forced the Battalion to assume a defensive role. Love Company moved into position in the vicinity of Ca’ del Monte, and Item Company was used to hold the newly won Battalion front. In the valley to the right of Monte delle Formiche, the 1st Battalion had pushed north and was almost abreast of the 2nd Battalion and the 339th Infantry on the right. During the night of 11 October, both sides were actively engaged in patrolling, and small firefights flared up along the entire regimental front. At 06:00, 12 October, the attack was again resumed, with the 3rd Battalion passing through the 2nd Battalion to take Monte della Vigna, north of Monte delle Formiche. The attacking battalion had advanced only a short distance beyond Monte delle Formiche when it became quite evident that another “Monte delle Formiche” would have to be taken. The successful conclusion of this engagement was followed by the characteristic German maneuver in Italy: when an area or mountain becomes untenable, to withdraw to the next favorable defensive position and wait for the Allies to press the attack again.
Analysis and Critique
In studying this operation, it is readily apparent that the mission assigned to the 2nd Battalion was extremely difficult. The basic principle is to envelop, flank, and cut off the enemy; however, circumstances may require a frontal attack. If the latter is the case, the enemy can be dislodged only through hard fighting. In this particular action it was not feasible to maneuver to the left of the mountain because the division on the left did not control terrain as far forward as did the 338th Infantry. The initial plan of attack was a good and sound concept but never materialized. Success in taking Maceratoia and failure to take Ca’ del Monte, with the remaining platoons of Easy Company pinned down by enemy fire, dictated a new course of action. Had the Battalion attacked with two companies abreast across the bare terrain, the result would undoubtedly have been excessively heavy casualties. Points worthy of criticism are: 1st: The enemy achieved partial success in his initial counterattack from Ca’ del Monte. The failure of unit commanders to organize alternate defensive positions and to consider the enemy’s counterattack capabilities made this “partial” success possible. 2nd: In any offensive action, heavy casualties must be expected and adequate replacements should be available. However, this was not the case in the instance of the capture of Monte delle Formiche. Throughout the entire Northern Apennines Campaign, units were required to launch their attacks with greatly reduced ranks. 3rd: Immediately after the capture of Maceratoia, a line of communication should have been established with the Company Command Post (C.P.) at La Casona. Because this was not done, the 1st Platoon was left without any means of communication when its radio failed. 4th: The initial attack on Ca’ del Monte might have succeeded if the 2nd Platoon of Easy Company had reached Maceratoia as intended, because with increased strength in the attacking force, the probabilities are that Ca’ del Monte could have been held.
Lesson learned
Some of the lessons to be learned from the Northern Apennines Campaign and from Monte delle Formiche are:
1 – In softening an enemy position for assault, it must be pounded relentlessly with concentrations of artillery, bombing attacks, tank and tank-destroyer fire, mortar barrages, bazooka fire, and hand grenades. All of this must be followed aggressively by the infantry. Concentrations and barrages have no value in any assault unless they are followed closely enough for the rifleman to close with the enemy before he realizes that the fire has lifted and rises to man his weapons. The enemy will recover the disadvantage the moment he knows you are there; you must beat him to it.
2 – In moving to take a building occupied by the enemy, throw a hand grenade or fire a bazooka round into the building. Immediately after the explosion, dash into the room with an automatic weapon firing. This surprise action almost always succeeds.
3 – In mountain fighting, the enemy usually places his automatic weapons and mortars to command trails, deep draws, and ravines. However, by “moving along the ridges,” these points of resistance can be bypassed, flanked, and cleared later. Take the high ground first, and it will take care of the low ground.
4 – Endurance and physical strength are essential for the fighter. Mountain warfare involves no new basic principles and, in most cases in Italy, did not require specially trained troops. However, the terrain encountered in the mountains required men to endure exceptional hardships and demanded peak physical condition.
5 – Unit commanders must consider human limitations. If the terrain is steep and movement is complicated by deep mud and the lack of trails, men are prone to lose contact. This applies especially to weapons platoons or heavily burdened units.
6 – Whenever a hasty defense is established for the night and inflammable material such as a haystack, vehicle, building, etc., is in front of you, tie an incendiary grenade to it. Run a wire from the grenade fuze to your position. Place ample powder or propelling charges around the material. In the event of a night counterattack, pull the wire. The material will burn, illuminating the area in front of you and catching the enemy completely exposed.
7 – During the training phase, men must be taught that bunching together is an invitation to casualties. This cannot be overemphasized, because if men are permitted to do so in training, they will do it in combat.
8 – The success of small units remains the backbone of victorious campaigns. The corollary to this is that the success of small units depends on the aggressive leadership of their commanders—the Sergeant, the Lieutenant.
9 – A reverse-slope defense is only as good as the time spent constructing it. A hastily prepared reverse-slope defense will collapse rapidly in the face of a determined attack.
10 – Wire communication in mountainous terrain is inadequate because of the time factor involved in laying lines. The answer to this is radios with longer range and greater portability.
11 – Mules employed in mountain warfare, when placed under trained personnel, prove invaluable for supply and resupply.
12 – Outpost positions must provide mutual support. A covered route from the outpost line to the MLR [Main Line of Resistance] is of vital importance.
13 – Every line or front position should have an alternate line or position. Every man must be thoroughly instructed on what to do in the event of a counterattack and if a withdrawal becomes necessary.
14 – Ridges continue to be the best means of approach, especially at night.
15 – Houses should not be used for defensive positions if other positions can be selected. If it is necessary to occupy a house, every man must have a predetermined firing position within the building. Captured buildings are invariably bombarded by the enemy.
17 – Once an objective has been taken, the leading elements must be reinforced without delay. This is especially true if the objective requires a force greater than that of the unit that captured it in order to be adequately defended. The enemy will execute deep and enveloping counterattacks to cut off all means of reinforcement, while at the same time launching a strong frontal attack to retake the lost position.
18 – If a small unit must operate from 500 to 1,000 yards ahead of the next supporting unit, reserves must be brought close enough so that the enemy cannot possibly cut the route of approach to the objective.
19 – Ground once gained must be held.
20 – The T/O [Table of Organization] is inadequate for evacuation in mountain warfare.
21 – It is essential for officers and noncommissioned officers to have a basic knowledge of artillery and the adjustment of artillery fire.
22 – Enemy weapons and equipment must be destroyed upon capture if evacuation is impossible.
23 – Ammunition and equipment must never be discarded.
24 – Orders must be obeyed even if they seem senseless. There is a reason behind each of them. Failure to obey may result in the suffering of others.
25 – Training of small units for independent action is highly necessary.
26 – Frontal attacks should be avoided unless they are absolutely essential to the success of the operation.
27 – Practically all lessons learned in the field or in battle merely emphasize the teachings found in field manuals. Whenever a basic principle is violated, a casualty results.